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CH!PlBR I 
IHRODUC!riOli 
"Air Force leaders to~ are faced with greater responsibil-
ities than ever existed in our hietory.•l 
"Bach commander, therefore, has the responsibility for 
utilizing the tools of the information services program to the 
fullest extent possible.•2 
"!rile objective. of the. information services program ••• must 
be pursued with importance no lese than that given the operational 
miaaion.•J 
!rile above quotatione are taken from the Air Force Information 
Seryicea Mapual, the gnide for commanders and their information 
services personnel currently in force. 
!rhe charge to commanders 1B clear and strong. But - what ia 
done to bring commanders to attend to this funotion? How cognizan' 
are they of this re.ponaibility7 How effective is their training 
to implement the intent of this directive? The answers to these 
que1tione are little known. 
Statement~~ problem. It ia the purpose of this study 
to contribute some new data on the attitudes of commanders and 
prospective commanders toward Air Force public relations and their 
public relations officers. 
Background. In March of 1952 Colonel Thor M. Smith submitted 
a research paper to the faculty of the Air War College of the Air 
Uninrsit;r on "Problem Ar.eae :l.n Air J'erce Public Relatione" n4 In 
an effort to document general~ preTailing attitudes toward public 
relatione among senior officer•, Colonel Smith survey-ed 65 full 
colonels attending ~he Air War College b;r means of a aix=item 
que a t:l. onnai re. 
Hia reaults were in some respects aetounding. Of the 65, 
57 said they- believed the mi•eion, objectives and doctrine of the 
U. S. Air Force public relatione were not clearly- defined nor 
understood b;r Air Force officers. 
In re~rd to a high level public relations assignment, 46 
admitted the;r would •avoid it, if poaeible!" Nine would accept 
it paseivel;r, while three agreed to eeek i' out. 
When aeked, "Do ;rou believe that public relations instruction 
and atud;r ehould be included in the Air War College curriculum?", 
36 said yea, 29, no, 
Full resulte of thie atud;r will be referred to frequent~ 
in comparieon with current findings" A complete tabulation of hie 
resulta appears in the Appendix. 
At the time of Colon$1 Smith's atud;y, a public relaUons 
officer wae pereopa non mta in the military forcea. 'lhis is 
hie description: 
The Defenae Appropriation• Act of 1951 earmarked a limit on 
the amount of money- which could be expended on military public 
relations activities. Accepting the circumstance that it wae a 
last minute "drop in" amendaent to the Act, and waa e;rmbolic 
of the growing reeentment among the American public and Congreaa 
of Government prop~dizing, it neverthelese doe• a great 
dieeervice to the United State• Ara.d J'orcelo Moreover, it 
pointe up, in very glaring faahion. the lack of under~ 
among our legielatin repreaentauv .. , of jus1i what tbe military 
2 
public relations mission is. Humor has it ~ba~ same coD«resa-
man was irked at the amount of money being spent by the A~ 
and Air Force on recruitiac radie programs. But recruitiac is 
only distantly related to the public relatioas mission. 
Recruiting is the "direct eelliac" in an attempt to get ealist-
ees, One of the main missions of public relatioas is a process 
at informiag ~he t~er oa how his money is beiag apeat, 
UnquestioD&bly the severe restrictive measures will be corrected 
in due course. As ene Air Jeres otticer put it, "You don't 
have to burn down the house to kill a few rats.• Ia the .eaa-
Ume the Air Jeres (all we:il &I the ArtiiT aad lav) will have 
rough sledding until the 1952-195.3 Appropriatioa is passed, 
But possiblY this arbitrar,r elash will net be without i~s 
bleaaiacs ,Y 
Jrom Celonel Smith's resume, twa things are obvious: tirat, 
the American public -- through ita elected representatives -- does 
aet wa•t to be propagaadized with ita own tax moaey; and secoad, 
it was hoped that duriag the lack of fuade lull, the public relatieae 
program weuld be everbauled amd, at least, iacompeteabi elimillated. 
la 1952, the Air Jeres was five years old. It had beea raieed 
te a level equivalent to the parent Arti/T and to the I&VT by the 
Armed Joroea Uniticatioa Aot of 1947. !oday, almolt six years later, 
it appears that aaother iaveater,r ia ia erder, 
As predicted by Coloael Smith, the iatormatiea budget waa 
restered. lurther, the Air Jeres took a big step ia reorganiziag 
its public relations tunctiea. Out of what had been the Public 
Information ottice, PIO, which was charged with press liaiaen aad 
collllii11Dity relations, there c.ame aa expaaded and well detined 
Information Services organilation. 
At the operating level, there were established tour separate 
functions: 
l. Public Information -- •!o transmit factual information 
concerning the Air Joroe to the'Amarican public.•? 
J 
2. Internal Information -- "To increase the effectiveness 
of its members both as producers within the institution 
and as r~presentatives among the public.•B 
' 
J, Communiti Relations -- "To promote and preserve harmon-
ious relations with the local civilian population.•9 
4, Hist,orical -- "To collect and preserve historical records, • 
etc,lO 
4 
In general, the program aimed for integration of the information 
functions under one office with resu1tant improvement of status and 
efficiency. 
Whether or not thie program has attained its objectivea is 
outside the purview of this atudT. HOwever, a part of any such 
aaeeaement would have to be the eval'DAtisn of how serious}T 
commanders take this particular part sf their many and varied 
responsibilities, 
Usefu1ness R!., lh1!, studz:, J.n effort is made herein h bring 
Colonel Smith's studT up to date. That is, a large group of senior 
officers have answered the same questionnaire which he administered. 
In addition, three categories of opinion have been added: 
1. Opinion of Air Ioree public relations instruction 
2. Opinion of organizational importance of public relations 
J, Opinion of relative importance of functions (aa noted above) 
lurther, an opportunity was ctven for any expression sf epinisn 
about public relations that the responding officer would care to make. 
Nearly half the reapondees made comments in this section, 
Junior officers and officer trainees were also surveyed. 
In this study, the responses have been tabulated and evaluated, 
pel"'llitting recoiDIISndations fer :future action when intioMM. 
»,r duplicati~ the or~inal questionnaire, a measure of 
change, or lack of it, is possibls. »,r expanding the questionnaire, 
some new and unexpected information has been gained, »,r enlarging 
the group of respondents, some measure of expectations of these 
officers, potentiall7 commanders, BaT be predicted. 
Hopefull7 then b7 defining the opinions of these officers 
the problems of the present and the future can be defined. 
Insofar as possible, to ever.r problem area there is tendered 
a solution. Solutions without action are meaningless. It is to 
the "management• of Air Pores public relatione, within whose 
jurisdiction such actien can be taken, that this atud7 is 
respectfullT dedicated. 
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CHA.PDR II 
Quaationnaire. An eleTen-item questionnaire was administered 
te all respondents. !he firat nine queatiens were closed-end with 
space for comments, but coamente were not requested, The other two 
questions were open end, one of which was simply: 
11. Do you haTe &liT c:o1111ents that you weuld like to Mke about the 
USAF public relations? 
The first six questions were the same as administered by 
Colonel !her M, Smith to 65 fellow students at the Air War College 
in 1952. His exact wording was retained. 
Each question pertained to a specific: objec:tiTe. The specific 
objectiTel were: 
1. Opinion of the USAf public: relatione pregram 
2. Krperienc:e with the USAP public relations program 
J. Cognizance of the USAP public: relatione mission, objec:tiTes 
and doctrine 
4. Opinion concerning USAl public relatione officers 
S. Attitude toward a public relatione assignment 
6. Opinion of public relatione instruction 
7, Opinlen of public relatione inatructor 
8. Opinion of adequacy of emphasis on public relations 
instruction 
9, Opinion of public relation•' proper place in the organisa-
t ional s truc:ture 
10. Expectation concerning public relations and public 
relatione officers 
8 
Inaamuch as 'he majoritT of the questionnaire was a replication, 
no pre-teat was neceeaarT, 
Face sheet data included onl7 general grade categories (field 
or compBDT), source of commission (aviation cadet, officer candidate 
echool, etc,), age (under 25, 25 to J5, and so en in ten Tear inter-
vals), length of service (under 5 Teara, 5,te 10, and so on in five 
Tear interval•), and whether or not rated. 
Sample. The testing period selected was 1 through 10 June 
1958, in order to restrict intervening variables among the various 
groups, if possible. As it turned out, this period was free of &DT 
major Air Force announcement or incident which would alter the 
results. 
Questionnaires were sent to the fallowing schools: 
1. Air University, Harwell Air Force Base, Alabama. This is 
the location of the Air War College (!or colonels); Air 
Command and Staff College (for lieutenant colonels and 
majors); and Squadron Officers School (!or captain& and 
senior lieutenants). 
2. 
J, 
4. 
5. 
United States Air Force Academ7, Denver, Colorado (now in 
its third Tear). 
United States Military Acade~, West Point, Hew York. 
United States lllaval Acade~, Annapolis, Maryland. 
United States Air Force Officer Candidate School, Lackland 
Air Force Base, Texas. 
In additien, to attain a sampling ef offieers other than those 
• 
attending schools, questionnaires were sent to headquarters of the 
following commands, selected on an &Ter,r-ether-name basis from an 
alphabetical listing of major air commands: 
1, Air ~raining Command, Scett Air ~orce Base, Illinois. 
2, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air ~orce Base, !lew York 
3. 11111 tar,r Air ~ransport Service, Andrews Air ~erce Base, 
Washington, D. C. 
4. North American Air Defense Command, Ent Air ~orcs Base, 
Celorado. 
S. Strategic Air Co-nd, Offutt Air ~orce Base, llebraska 
!be assistance of the information services officer ef the 
school or base was requested in monitoring the distribution and 
collection of questionnaires. 
!be following response was receiTed: 
1, Air UniTersit7: 358 eut of 820 majors and lieutenant 
colonels attending Air Command and Staff Cellege, $he 
one aTailable class during the testing period, !hose 
officers represented all commands, all classifications, 
rated and non-rated, reserve en extended actiTe dut7 
and regular •1 
2. Air ~orce Academy: 97 efficers ef all ranks, including 
members of the Commandant's DiTisien, ~ac:ult7, Operations, 
etc,2 
J, Officer Candidate School: 91 efficer candidates, 
representing 10~ ef Class SB=B,J 
4, Borth American Air Defense Command: 19 efficers ef 
9 
Y&rious ranks within the headquarters. 
S. Continental Air Command: 16 officers of comp&DT grade 
from headquarters and attached units.4 
6. Headquarters Bighth Air ~orce, Strategic Air Command, 
Westover Air Foree Base, Massachusetts: JO comp&DT 
grade officers with less than five 7ears' ssrTice.S 
In addition, two responses were set aside, one from an 
A~ officer attending Air Command and Staff College and one 
from a civilian at one of the Headquarters. 
Nine responses were received too late for inclusion in the 
statistical summar7 of the first nine questions; however, their 
comments are included in the Appendix. 
The total number of responses is 622, of which 611 are 
included in the statistics. 
~or comparative purposes the following greups were then 
established: 
Officers attending Air Command and Staff College: 358 
Other Officers: 162 
Officer Candidates: 91 
In this w~, strict anoDJmitT could be maintained without 
command identification. And the groupings were large enough to 
be workable into meaningful percentages. 
4d•ipistratiop. Ia Colonel Smith's stud7, he personallT 
instructed his fellow officer• at the heading of hia questioaaaire 
ae follows: 
10 
Will TOU lend me a hand (and a pencil) for about two minuteeT 
I need TOur help in part ef the researching for ~ paper. This 
won •t hurt a bit -- and it's anoJil1DoUI. And thanks a lot in 
advance for TOur cooperation.S 
In the current stud7, the queetionnaire was prefaced as 
folloWI: 
The following questionnaire is designed to asaeae the 
effectiveness of the Air Porce Information program since its 
reorganizatien five Tears ago and to plan future requirements. 
Tour name is net required but Tour honest opinion is. 
are ne right or wrong answers; TOur peraenal evaluatien 
requested. 
There 
h 
In both Colonel Smith's studT and that of the Air Command and 
Staff College, the efficers were permitted to take the questionnaire 
to their quarters to fill aut, In the Headquarter• and Officer 
Candidate School, theT were filled out in the respoadee'e effice 
and claasreem, respectivelT. 
In all cases, responses were strictl7 voluntar7. 
Ceding. ~estions 1 through 9 were pre-ceded as iadicated oa 
the questiennaire. The open-end questions were coded as received, 
then reviewed to aaeure unitormitT. 
In ~stion 10, "What do TOU consider the most important dutT 
ef a public relatiens efficer?•, the reeponses fell into the follow-
ing major categories: 
1. Jxternal (public) intormatiea 
2. hternal and internal information 
3. Internal info~tion 
4. CemmunitT relatiena 
S. Selliag 
8. Miecellaneoua 
11 
9. No comment 
B.r this differentiation, coding was clear-cut in nearl7 all 
cases. Apparent overlap of categories 1 and 4 above were recon-
ciled by the following criteria: mention of the relatively paesive 
•ta inform• or "to educate• or bath were determined to be in the 
information classification; community relations was mere broadl7 
construed to include activities ather than information and 
educatbn. 
Both categories were separated from category 5, •selling,• 
in that the reapease indicated activity that would •put the Air 
Force in a favorable light• er otherwise indicated manipulatiea 
or aggressive action to obtain support, not merely relate. 
~e mast frequentlT encountered response vas "Sell the Air 
Farce to the public,• which is beyond the information and 
education function. 
Comments to Question 12, "Do you have any comments that you 
would care to make about the USAF public relations?•, were coded 
liberallT. It early became apparent that. :k,y words dld not 
necessarily reflect the spirit of the comment. Therefore, every 
comment was given careful attention to the extent that it would 
be placed in the category the officer himself would have placed 
it in if it had beea a closed-end question, 
It was further determined that if mare than one idea were 
expreued in the commenh, primacy would dic,tate the category. 
lxamination ef the total responses, as classified, is 
invited in the Appendix, 
12 
DD'IliTI!l'IOB a. 'l'lWIS 
When a person in the militar,r writes of militar,r matters, it 
becemes difficult to separate the "jargon• from generallT recognized 
and understood terms. An effort then will be made to ferret out and 
to clarif7 those ~erma which maT be unfamiliar to the civilian 
reader. 
Grades. A general grouping of grades has been made according 
to the traditional Anq groupings. It further serves to preserve 
the anoD7mit7 assured respondees. 
CompaDT grade incluies lieutenants and captains; field 
graie, majors and colonels. 
Comreepd. Command will be herein differentiated b7 small and 
capital c. Small c (command) refers to anT organization which, 1• 
ascending size, ~ be: Detachment, Squadron, Group, Wiag, Air 
Force (usuallT nu.bered), Commani, Headquarters USAr. C•pital C 
(Command) refers onl7 t~ that echelon immediatel7 below Headquarters 
US!J'. 
College, School, A2!demr. College means the Air War College, 
1.3 
or similar college of another branch, when applied to respondees ia 
the grade of Colonel; the Air Command and Staff College, open to 
lieutenant colonels and majors; and the colleges and universities 
participating in the Reserve Officers ~raining Corps program, 
evidenced in all grades, but ~ &mODg lieuteaaat respondees. 
Schools include• Squadron Officers School, open to captains and 
senior lieutenants; Officers Basic Militar,r !l'raining School, for 
directl7 commissioned officers; Officers Candidate School, enlisted 
men who are officer trainees; and miscellaneous militar,r technical 
schools, including flying traini&«. 
Acade~ pertains to both the U. S. Militar,r Acade~ at West 
Point and the U. s. Naval Acade~ at Annapolis, in which up to oae-
third of the graduating classes have been able to volunteer to serve 
with \he Air Force. It further includes the Air Force Acade~ at 
Denver, now entering its fourth year of operation. 
Organizational Chart. !he Office of Information Services 
normally appears as a small box off to the right of the Commander. 
Rated, Non~ted. A rated officer ~ be a pilot or a~ 
other officer trained for duties with an Air Force crew; a non-
rated officer is a non-flying officer. !his distinction does not 
iaclu4e whether or not the officer ia currentlT on fl7ing statue, 
that is, eligible to fl7, at the present time. Bather, the 
distinction is intended to differentiate between those officers 
who have been trained for flying duties and those who have not. 
Inform&tiop Services. As indicated in Chapter I, public 
relations is a part of the functions of the Office of Informatica 
Services. This office is aormally charged with four responsibil-
itiea: internal information, external information, community 
relations, and hist:orical. Public relations is properly a part 
of the first three named. 
RDJIUWICBS 
1. Lett.er from Colonel Laurence H. Macauley, Chief, Infor-
mation Services, Headquarters Air University, Maxwell Air Force 
'Base, Ala., to the author, dated June 19, 1958. 
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2. Letter from Mrs. Mabel M. Patrick, secretary to Director 
of Information Services, Headquarter• United States Air Force 
Acade~, Denver, Colorado, dated June 18, 1958. 
J, Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Hamilton, Head-
quarters Officer Candidate School, United States Air Force, Lackland 
Air Force Base, !exae, dated June 11, 1958. 
4. Letter from Major Philip J. Mahar, Director of Public 
Intor.ation, Headquarters Continen\&1 Air Command, Mitchel Air 
Force Base, New Y~rk, dated June 18, 1958. 
5. Colonel Thor M. Saith, "Problem Areas in Air Force Public 
Relations,• (unpublished research paper, Air Universit7, March 1952), 
p. 1 of Appendix 1. 
6. Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Coleman, Chief 
of Information, Headquarters Kighth Air Force (Strategic Air 
Command), Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetta, dated Jul7 2, 1958. 
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CHAP'l'lm III 
StJRV:H' J'INDINGS 
This chapter deals with the findings of the first ten ques-
tiona. nine of which were closed-end. The responses to Qneation 
10 were of sufficient siadlarit7 to lend themselves to treatment 
as cloeed=end questions. 
The next chapter will deal with comments on the program as 
a whole. 
Xn all the following tables, figures given are percentages 
of total response. 
!Al!LB I 
9v•stign 1. What is 70ur opinion of the USAr public rela-
ti ODS progl"&&ll T 
l:l.eld Grade 
Comp&DT Grade 
Officer Candidates 
lfo 
S11peribs 'Adeqaate I:afei ipr CoiiiiiiBDt 
2 
1 
6 
31 
71 
80 
6,5 
17 
17 
20 
2 
9 
1 
0 
• Colonel Smith"• 19.52 atud7. 
It is apparent that senior officers in a school situation 
are more critical of the information program than thoee in the 
field. Further, they are more critical toda7 than a~ years,ago. 
Both officers in the field and officer candidates assess 
the program as adeqaate by an impressive majority. 
Among those who checked Adequate, two added the following 
comments: 
"In some locations and inferior in others.• 
"But can stand worlds of improvement. • 
Two who indicated Inferior, added the comments: 
"Not even remotely close to that conducted by the Navy.• 
"Based on national press releases and follow-up action.• 
Two who failed to indicate any choice, commented: 
•unnecessary." 
"Don't honestly know --haven't been aware of it for 
last year.• 
17 
TABLE II 
Question 2. What has been your personal contact (within the 
past few years) with the USAF public relations program? 
Commander Received Attended None 
or PR PR Bulle- Schools, 
Staff Member tins or Confer-
Guidance ences, etc 
Air War College (1952 Study) 37f. 48fo 9f. 29f. 
Air Command & Staff College 17 20 6 43 
Other Officers 
l!'ield Grade 37 37 17 37 
Company Grade 11 27 17 5.3 
Officer Candidates 3 25 16 60 
Percentages do not total 100 as more than one choice was 
permitted. 
In the first category, responses are the expected; that is, 
officers of lesser rank would naturally not have held command or 
public relations staff positions. 
In the second category, it appears that inconsistency of 
results invalidate any conclusion. 
As might be expected, the percentage of those who attended 
schools, conferences or lectures on public relations is small. It 
further appears that orientation lectures in new assignments (a 
rather general practice among bases today) are not considered 
public ~elations lectures. J'urther, public relations topics used 
in CoJDma.nder's Call (formerly known as the Information and Education 
Hour) are either not recognized as public relations, or, more 
18 
likely, are not giveno 
In the current study, the largest percentage of each group 
indicate that they have received no public relations guidance, or 
at least have not recognized it as suoho 
T.ABLJ: III 
Question 3o In your opinion, are the missions, objectives 
and doctrine of the US!l public relations clearly defined and 
unders~ood by Al officers? 
Yes Ho Don't Know Ho Comment 
Air War College (1952 Studr) 
Air Command & Staff College 
Other Officers 
J'ield Grade 
<loJ11PB.D7 Grade 
Officer Candidates 
6'/> 881> 
3 80 
13 
17 
24 
65 
59 
34 
s'/> 
16 
21 
23 
42 
Two officers added comente. One who checked I!L, also wrote: 
nwcy COIIIPlicate a BiiiiPle program with doctrine?·• 
The other, who indicated Don't~. added: 
0Does PR have mieaione, objecUves and doctrine?• 
Again, the evidence ie similar to 1952: Public relations 
is not well underetood by officers. lurther, if thare is &DT doubt 
as to whether they are or are not, senior officers are less likely 
to give public relatione the benefit of the doubt. 
19 
Qpestion 4. What ia your opinion of the moat recent public 
relations officer under your command or close observation? 
Well Ade= 
Qaalified quate 
Inade= Donut No 
quate Know Comment 
Air War College (19.52 StudT) 23~ 
Air Colllllllllld & Staff .College 
Other Officers 
J'ield Grade 
Company Grade 
Officer Candidates 
ll 
so 
17 
9 
26 
33 
26 
24 
23~ 
3.5 
.5 
.5 
9 
1~ 
27 
ll 
.52 
.58 
.5 
Whereas fewer officers in all categories, excepting field 
grade in the field, are inclined to adjudge public relations 
than in 19.52, again, the officers of Air Command and Staff College 
are the most severe critics, junior officers the least critical. 
Bven though it wae not desirable to point criticism at any 
one command, the "Well Qaalified~ responses from field grade 
officers further analyzed to determine whether or not the majority 
of these judgments were from a particular command. !he percentages 
by command were not conclusive. 
~o of the officers who indicated Well Qpalified added 
00Thia doesn't include AU (Air university) == I don't know 
the AU PR.w 
"At Air University only.• 
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No comments were made bW those who cheeked Adegpate. Three who 
responded Ipadegpate made comments: 
"Eager but isn't informed about his duties.• 
00Groasl;:r. • 
•see At Times pix of PRs.'" 
One officer indicated both Well 9n!lified and ID84egpate with the 
comment: 
"A well qualified PR except he was selling ever.r thing in the 
Air ~oroe But PR.• 
Three officers indicated no choice of response, while two 
made no choice but commented: 
1He stunk." 
"Social Climber and Bootlicker.• 
TABLB T 
Qgestion 5. What would be ;your personal reaction to a high 
level public relations assigment? 
Seek Accept it Avoid it No 
it out passivel;:r if possible Comment 
Air War College (19.52 Stvq) .5'/> 
Air Command & Staff College 16 
Other Officer11 
~ield Grade 
Compan;r Grade 
Officer Candidates 
21 
19 
43 
14'/> 
31 
27 
28 
29 
71~ 
33 
44 
29 
7 
19 
7 
23 
22 
21 
22 
Sin~e 1952, the alarming percentage of officers who would 
avoid a publi~ relations assigment, if possible, has decreased 
considerably; however, it remains larger than an7 other preferen~e 
An indication of wbT this percentage remains high ~ be well 
explained by the comments which were made. Moat, as follows, par-
tained to qualifications: 
"Not qualified-- this requires training.• 
"I think this is an area that requires inherent qualifications 
and a parson without these qualifications would do more harm than 
good. 00 
"This is the trouble -- gpalified people should be selected 
' for this type of duty. !here are those ·in the Al who have studied 
this in college.• 
"!am not trained to assume the proper duties of aPR officer.• 
"Only because of lack of qualific~ .... • 
"Jro place for an amatellll'o~ • 
•:aec~~o'llee of lack of adequatl!l' 'l!aclrground. • 
"No point to this question. Personnel must be assigned to 
the duty who are trained and have the qualifications necaa1ar,r.• 
TWo others responded with slightly different connotation: 
"Yrankly 1°m not enough of an extrovert for this type of job. 1 
"I"m not the type,• 
And one c oiDIIIBnted: 
"Due to lack of policy from DOD (DepartHnt of Defense).• 
!Al!Lll VI 
Question 6. Do you believe· tbat public relations instruction 
should be included in the curriculum of th• college, school or 
acade~ tbat you are now attending, or last attendedt 
Yea No llo CoDmlent 
Air War College (1952 Study) 55f. 45:' of, 
Air Command & Staff College 88 8 :3 
Other Officer• 
lield Grade 6:3 29 7 
Company Grade 74 19 7 
Officer Candidates 89 4 7 
Certainly, a considerable increase is obvious among current 
officers' desire for public relations training. 
Of those who indicated l!Le two said: 1Def,nitely1 , and 
one added •g• Others who said~ and coemented modified their 
response as follows: 
"Lightly.• 
"A little more than was.• 
"But not to qualif7 or re=tr&in PBO'a.• 
' 
~But not AJ ll.§£ !.l.o • 
!2 responses were modified in three instances: 
"Missions, objectives, doctrine, 'militant freedom', democrac7, 
~§!.,should be covered so thoroughly tbat public relations will 
inevitably result.• 
•Not specificall7, PR implic~tions of various activities ma7 
be includedo • 
"Believe this should be given to personnel talented in this 
field in special schoolingo 1 
TAliUl VII 
Question 7, What is 70ur opinion of the public re1ations 
instructor in the college, school or acade~ 70u are now attending 
or last attended? 
Air War College (1952 Stud7) 
Air Command & Staff College 
Other Officers 
Field Grade 
CompaD7 Grade 
Officer Candidates 
Good Poor None No Comment 
Not Applicable 
4 17 77 
9 8 8.) 
15 12 8J 
2 
0 
0 
Although the percentages are heavilT indicative of no public 
relations instruction, the results are somewhat inconclusive in 
that Good, Poor and None, responses were received from groups 
exposed to the same trainingo 
In the Air Command and Staff College responses, one officer 
checked Good and added: 
•No o~ instructor •hough a .. eral guest speakers on the 
eubjaci.• 
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TWo checked Poor, commenting: 
"He was a civilian speakero• 
"!here was hardly &nio 1 
Of those indicating no choice from the suggested comments on the 
questionnaire, written in responses were: 
"Didn't recognize oneo" 
"Some good, some pooro" 
"N/A (Not Applicable) there is no such 'instruetor. •• 
"Unknowno 0 
•Fair. " ( 'l'wo o ) 
!ABLJ: Till 
Question 8. How do ;you feel about the emphasis on public 
realtions in the instruction ;you received in the college, school 
or acade~ ;you are nov attending, or last attended? 
Air Command & Staff College 
Other Officers 
J'ield Grade 
Company Grade 
Officer Candidates 
Too mach Too little Eno~h 
Emphasis Emphasis :Emphasis 
1~ 
s 
0 
0 
56~ 
3? 
.31 
.3.3 
2~ 
1? 
22 
18 
No 
Comment 
14~ 
.39 
4? 
49 
Among senior officers, there appears agreement that there 
is too little emphasis on public relations in the instruction at 
their school. However, there is an unaccountable, tho~h slight, 
25 
disparity among student officers and officers in the field as to 
•too much emphasis.• 
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The intent of this question was to determine the officer's 
opinion of the amount of emphasis on public relations instruction. 
~here appears to be a misundere1:anding of the question, as illustrated 
in the following crossbreak: 
In the Air Command & Staff College group, of 162 who said they 
had received no public relations instruction in the school they were 
attending, 
2 said it had too 11110h emphasis, 
78 said it had too little emphaaia, 
47 said it had enough emphasis, 
.35 said none. 
Of 41 who said their instraction waa poor, 
None said it had too much emphasis, 
.31 said it had too little s :' s... 
7 said it had enough empbaais, 
J said none. 
Of 48 who said their instruction was good, 
None said it had too much emphasis, 
18 gaid it had too little emphasis, 
29 said it had enough emphaeia, 
1 said none. 
2? 
!.Al!LB II 
QnuUcn 9. Where do ;rou feel that public relations should 
appear on an organization chart? 
Personal Under Under Under No Jth· J.' 
Staff of Adjutant Personnel Opera- Comment 
Co!lllllander tiona 
Air Command & 
Staff College 90~ 1~ 1~ 1~ 2~ .3~ 
Others 
li'ield Grade 81 s 2 0 2 9 
CoiiiP8JlT w 68 12 ? ? 1 s 
Officer 
Candidates ?0 10 11 0 .3 6 
Although this ~estion was intended to allow an expression of 
opinion (as in all questions), it is likel;r that this particular one 
was considered subjectivel;r. It ia difficult therefore to ascertain 
what weight to give the heav;r percentage of "right" answers, 
One who answered "Personal Staff of Commander• also commented: 
"The onl;r placell 1 
In the space allowed for place on the organizational chart 
other than those suggested, the following were written in: 
"Directl;r under commander.• 
"Squadron commander.• 
"Depends on the function of the or~nization, some have no 
requirement, while others, like fl;ring safet;r, are important,• 
"Should be professional unit under Headquarters USAJ.• 
•separate staff agency.• 
"Part of each squadron, division, branch, etc. 
"Department of Defense.• 
"Personal reaponeibility of commander.• 
"At such level as to be fully informed." 
"Shouldn't even appear.• (TWo.) 
As explained under Coding in Chapetr II, the r~sponses to 
the next queation fell into five major categories, plus Miscella-
neous and No Comment. 
The responses to this question are a far cry from the inform-
ation expected. In 1947, while engaged in graduate journalistic 
study at the University of Miseouri, Major (then Captain) Arthur 
Dreyer surveyed publishers, editors and reporters on their opinions 
of armed forces public relations. Among his replies was this one 
from Hanson Baldwin, Military Aditor of the New York Times: 
Too many of them -- PRO's -- had limited or no knowledge of 
their Jobe; some of them thought their job was to "protect" 
their boea; others thought propaganda was fact; many believe 
•cover-up• their function. Too many of them were awed bT the 
brass, and were content to act as "time-servera• or "~ssers 
of the buck.•l 
Queation 10 of this etudy then aought to determine if officer• 
in the position of commanders and prospective commanders expected 
results aimilar to tb~ae of Hanson Baldwin's description. 
The reaulte refute this aaaumption. 
On the contrary, officers today have a notion of the function 
of a public relations officer that closely parallels hie actual, 
regulation-directed function. 
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Ul!LKX 
Qu.eetion 10 e What do 70u consider the most important dut7 
of a public relations officer? 
Air Collllll&nd Others Officer 
& Staff College Field CompaD7 Candidates 
Internal Information 2'1> 2f, 2f, 2f, 
Internal & llxternal 
.5 .5 ll .5 
llxternal Information 28 2.5 30 16 
Communit7 Relations 1.5 ll 1.5 46 
Selling 31 27 24 7 
Miscellaneous 9 17 6 4 
No Comment 8 ll 12 20 
At the conclusion of the c~ding, all responses were reviewed 
to assure uniformit7. 
ConsistentiT, in all groups, there is the small percentage of 
those who consider the public relations job to be an internal one. 
TrPical response• in thi1 categor7 inolude the following: 
•Establish an educational program for all AJ' personnel on 
activities of current AJ' developments and policies.• 
"To imbue all militar.r ~o~~l within his jurisdiction of 
the importance of PR and to recommend specific actions that can be 
taken. • 
In general, the feeling appears to be that •a well informed 
airman is the best public rJqations man.• 
Be7ond this consideration, more than twice this number 
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included both internal and external. Among the more comprehensive 
descriptions were these: 
"At baee level, the harmonious relationship between the 
military and the civilians of the local communities -- pOOus --
education re: national and military objectives for both civilian 
and military. • 
0Bducation of the command and surrounding communities in 
concepts and. philosoph¥ of militar.r component of our nation 'a 
power." 
"Inform." 
Except among officer candidate•, the largest number believe 
that the Public Information function is paramount. Most modified 
the information with such considerations as security, facta, 
timeliness and Air 7orce problems. Representative responses 
include: 
"Keep'ing the public well informed on current and proposed 
AF activities eommensurate with security requirements.• 
"Getting the 'word' to the public. ~oo much ia withheld on 
security grounds.• 
·~imelr news releasee and instant reaction to news stories 
detrimental to the Air Force.• 
•~stabliah constant feeding to civil media the mission of 
the organization and items of interest. Programs esta~lished to 
counter bad publicity are insufficient.• 
"Let the public know what the Air 7orce problems are as well 
as what the Air Force is and does.• 
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•To keep the public informed on air power in terms they 
understand." 
It was often difficult to distinguish between mere public 
information and community relations. The words "inform• and 
"educate• were put in the previous category; a mention of 
•relations" and other' activity beyond making news releases was 
construed to be community relations. This group (except in the 
case of officers candidates, who believe this function more 
important than any other) was barely half as large as that of 
those who would re~trict the function to information. Typical 
' responses were,: 
"Professional manner of improving relations with civilian 
populace and publicizing the roles of the USAF." 
"Community relations and advancing the knowledge of the 
general public as to the importance and need for the AJ.• 
"To present the USAf and his command (not hie commander) 
t'o the public. • 
The desirability of aggressivenes1 in molding public opinion 
is evidenced more among senior officers. As a sample group, the 
the largest single group,pf respondees was carefully analyzed for 
content. This is the Air Command and Staff College (all field 
grade) rated officers, repreeenting over half that major group 
(162:261). Of the 78 officers (.31~) whole responses fell in this 
.31 
category • .34 actually used the word •sell." The most often recurring 
single response was to this question: "Sell the Alto the public.• 
In other categories, no identical response was ever received. 
Probably the best example of this eategor,y was this one: 
"To sell air power, its capabilities, its hazards and its 
problems to the public. To garner their most complete support of 
our activities.• 
Of the 78, 13 used the word "favorable,• for example: 
"To insure that the public gets useful, significant and 
favorable facts.• 
Of the 78, 31 used the word "influence,• Other recurriag 
words were: best light possible, put AF's best foot forward, 
make public glad, and constructive!T propagandize. 
Of the miscellaneous responses, one categor,r recurred 
as frequently as one of the major categories; that is, a desire 
for a truthful information program, strongly implying that the 
present program is not as truthful as it could be. Responses in 
this vein included: 
"Give a true picture-- a bigger picture.• 
"Tell the absolute truth." 
"To get timelY, accurate and trulY informative information 
on the USAF to the American public, This is not being done.• 
Second largest of the miscellany is really the "book" 
solution to the question, which is •to advise the commander and 
his staff on public relations matters." Less than 1~ gave this 
response. 
In numbers too small to be accountable as percentages, five 
officers said: "To further air power, national objectives, Air 
Porce objectives, etc.• Three said: "Too keep himself informed." 
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"Too much personal publicit7.• 
"From observation his function is to ball7hoo the command, 
the commander and other PROs.• 
"At what level?" 
•work. • 
"Educate the public on the threat of communism and how the 
AF aids in the containment of communism.• 
"Explain why as well ~s what.• 
"Thorough knowledge of missions, etc.• 
8 To tell the AF stofT, not build up individuals.• 
•stop wor~ing about getting the Colonel's picture in the 
local paper and thereb7 promoting own self interests.• 
"To deal in 'awareness' through whatever communications 
media available, 'at all times.'" 
"Define the USAF role in American affairs.• 
"Educate and keep US public informed. Protective propa-
ganda tool centrall7 controlled in overseas theater.• 
"Answer letters from Congressmen.• 
"None. n 
"Keeping a pulse on 1-t 11G1ilk ~ion. Uaiug skills in 
generating support of influential pressure groups and in educati~ 
public to needs and affairs of the Air Force.• 
"To represent the Commander in all base-communit7 public 
relations. • 
"Erplaining to the extent pe~issable command position on 
controversial issue~.· 
:n 
"Know his job and work at ito• 
•Keeping good faith with everyone"" 
"To train personnel in the command on'their responsibilit;r 
toward PR and to motivate them in carT71ng out these responsibili-
ties, • 
"The protection at the airmllll-civilian relationship with the 
accent on the dut;r the serviceman performs as a service to the 
individual citizen,• 
"Accomplishing hi1 mission,• 
"Everyone understand publie relations but few practice them" 
Publl.e relaUolle officere ahoul~ motivate peo:ple to practice 
principles the;r alread7 know,• 
SUMMARY 
In terms of the specific objectives of this questionnaire, 
certain conlusions may be drawn: 
1. Opinion of the Public Relations program" Senior officers 
at the Air Command and Staff College are more critical of the pro-
gram than the Air War College officers of six years ago. Junior 
officers are far more tolerant, but very few consider it superior. 
2, Experience with the USAr public relations program, The 
largest number of all groups SB.T the;r have -Mel !!Q. contact with the 
program; of the balance, the contact is lessened with the more 
junior in rank. 
J, Cognizance of the USAl public relations mission, object-
ives and doctr'ine, The majorit;r of officers do not believe that 
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the mission, objectives and doctrine are well understood. Of 
those who believe they are underatood, the more junior the officer, 
the more optimistic he is. 
4. Opinion concerning USAF public relations officers. 
Again, the Air Command and Staff College students are more 
critical than any other group. However, field gT&de officers 
on the job are the least critical. Junior officera, in the 
majority, admit they "don't know,• 
S. Attitude' toward a public relations assignment. Although 
most say they would avoid it, if poaaible, a large number have 
indicated that they are unqualified. It is likely that the 
responses of both this atudy. and tha~ of 1952 are invalidated 
in this light. 
6. Opinion of public relations instruction, All officers 
agree,decisivel7, that it would be. a good thing. 
7. Opinion of public relations instructor. The large 
majority of officer• say that they have had.none. Of thoae who 
have had such instruction, the appraiaal is evenly divided 
between good and poor. 
8. Opinion of adequacy of emphasis on public relations 
instruction. Considering that moat officers have had none, the 
evidence is that most would like to aee more emphasis on public 
relation• inatruction. 
9. Opinion of public relations' proper place in the organ-
izational structure. If thia queation is considered objectivel7, 
moat officers believe that public relations belonga where it is. 
3S 
10. Expectation concerning public relatione and public 
relatione officers. Most officers agree that information is of 
paramount importance, but there is a growing tendency for more 
aggressive action to mould opinion to the Air Force'• favor, 
At the end of the ~estionnaire, space was allotted for 
comments, if any, Of the total number of questionnaire• 
returned, 46% took this opportunity to make general comments 
and specific ones. These voluntary evaluations, suggestions 
and criticiama will be taken up separately in the next chapter. 
RKrBREHCES 
1. Arthur Dreyer, "A Study of Public Relation• and Ita 
Application to the Ar~ Air Forces," (unpublished Master's 
Thesia, the University of Missouri, Columbia, 1947). 
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CIW"l'BR IV 
DISCUSSION 
More than 46~ of the 611 officers who answered the questiou-
naire.volunteered comments at the end. 
Of these, less than 1 in 100 commented favorab~ on the 
program. Less than 1 in 100 even commented favorably with quali-
fication. The balance made criticisms, suggestions or simply 
expressed disappointment or disapproval. 
The adverse criticis~a may be considered in ten categories: 
1. Lack: of professionalism J~ 
2. Miscellaneous (mostly uncomplimentary 
without specific suggestions) 20 
J. Lack of aggressiveneaa 14 
4. Lack: of "The Big Picture• 11 
S. Overemphasis ef trivialitiea 8 
6. Lack: of a good AP television show 7 
7. Other service• better S 
8. Air callisians 4 
9. Lack of coiiiiDilDd support J. 7 
10. Lack: of facts, tru-thfulness J 
In this chapter, the criticism• will be taken up in that order, 
excepting Miacel+aneous, which is treated last. 
LACK or PROrBSSIORALISM 
It ia generally agreed among these respondent• that a public 
relations assignment requires special qualifications. Just what 
these special qualifications are is less clear. 
Inexperienqe. The major criticism is levelled at junior 
officers in public relatione assignments who lack overall exper-
ience and understanding of the mission and of the "jargon.• 
"This duty_is too often assigned as an additional duty to 
non-competent personnel, Teo often public relations personnel 
will write an article on a certain area and not have it ok'd 
by a specialist in that area prior to publication, The resul' 
is that much misinformation is released," 
"PIOs are releasing news items as an authority when they are 
not qualified to technically explain the true Ar pesitien, 
Example: "The crew was flying blind.' On s June sa. on c:ss, 
Douglas Edwards' program about :B-52 training -s certainly a 
poor news release. Proper screening of tne film and the story 
would have averted such & debacle.• 
Personality characteristics. There is a tendency of officers 
of all grades to define the public relations job as one requiring 
special characteristics. 
"Personnel assigned to this duty are not the type te enlist 
the cooperation of key personnel to assist them in their jobs. 
Too often they approach their jeb as being one in which they 
are selling themselves instead of the Air lorce.• 
Self-Interest. There can be no doubt that many officers feel 
that public relations officers use their proximity to the commander 
and their contacts unduly. The publicity of information officers 
in Air Foree Times has created among many a decidedly negative 
reaction, 
"Teo often ISOs are bootlicking, publicity seekers who put 
their COs and their own pictures in papers and eeldem indicate 
knowledge of their organization's mission.• 
Lack ef Direction. Beth Headquarters USAF and commanders 
come in for a share ef the blame in failing to direct their ewn 
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public relations officers. 
"I feel that the entire public has little knowledge of the 
Air Force, its operations and support ef national policy. 
Better trained personnel would solve this problem -- also 
more specific guidance from the Department of Defense and 
U. S. Air Force.• 
Lack of Training. Several sound ideas have been proposed 
to remedy the situation. The best expressed of these is as 
fellows: 
"(1) Get awB¥ from the newspaper approach. 
"(2) PR is a science and involves more than ability to 
repeat news and news events. 
"(3) Prepare PR officers with public relations, industrial 
relations, psychology of personality, and other courses that 
apply to a good public relations program. Further, a point 
missed in the AF public relations starts from within -- D!1 
without the organizatien. The key to this program is having 
the members sell the program,• 
Inherent to many replies but not openly expressed is the opinion 
that public relations shsuld endeavor to sway opinion. 
"Part ef the PI0°a duty should be to analyze public 
opinion, anticipate if possible trends ef opinion, and plan 
to slant their public relations program according te this 
analysis.• 
LACK OF AGGRESSIVEHISS, DYNAMISM 
The trend of responses in this category connote that there 
is need for more·aggressive, dynamic and emphatic action, Other 
thoughts indicated are a need for revitalization, expansion and 
planning. 
"In ~ opinion, USAF public relations has been consistently 
weak, ineffective and not conducive to a public understanding 
of the Air Force. The Air Force is in need of an aggressive 
and highly objective PIO program which will adequately place 
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the Air Force in the public favor and influence it to support 
the USAF as our strongest defense arm. 
"Too much public relations effort is expended in promoting 
the Air Force to the Air Force -- in short, the Air lorce talks 
to itself too much through its PR effort. At present, their 
programs tend to be of a negative reaction rather than the 
positive progressive educational conditioning type needed. 
They should atop being 'whipping beys' placed in untenable 
positions but 'fait accompli' and should educate in ad.vance 
to the public at large the exigencies of a modern day Air 
Force, They should 'sell' the unconvinced public rather 
than the mothers and fathers who have always been proud of 
their children's effort• and always will be,• 
LACK Ol 'THE BIG PICTUU' 
A preoccupation with day by day affairs comes in fer a share 
of crticism, The fine line that separates a greater need fer "the 
big picture• on the part of local information officers from lese 
emphaail en trivialities ie indeed a fine one. Probably it is more 
a case of expressing one'a self positively and negatively, There 
is a divergence of opinion among officere as to just what "the big 
picture• really is, i'rivialities are apparently "pet peeves• that 
officers harbor, yet cannot be ignored for often it is upon these 
that these sum of the program is aaaesaed. 
The most general dimensions of "the big picture" are best 
defined by this officer: 
"The USAF needs to exert far greater effort in explaining 
to the public the need fer and the ability of the USAF. Good 
public relations can be achieved only if the public has a firm 
understanding and a genuine appreciation of USAF operatiens 
and objectives. .rforts to improve public relations must be 
initiated at the highest level in the USAl, and these efforts 
should be closely coordinated throughout the USAF.• 
On the whale, this category evoked the most scholarly descriptions. 
An interesting combinatien with the vernacular was this field 
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grade officer's recommendation: 
•~alls flat en its face in generating a favorable attitude 
en the part of the public and in generating guidance to USAF 
personnel en how to generate a favorable response from the 
public. !t support on whT the military should be supported 
and be entitled to expect support as first class citizens. 
Not mud debber leeches on the societ7.• 
A common criticism contained in several of the categories is that 
public·relatiens are too negative, rather than positive in action, 
or the "fireman• concept. This idea is contained in another field 
grade officer's comments: 
·~ impression has been that the USAF PR program is strictlT 
a stop-gap measure. Continuous acceptable level of effort 
should be present, representing all 0vital 0 issues relative 
to air power." 
Briefl7, theee ideas can be expressed as: 
"Let's get the truth about air power te the public." 
OVEREMPHASIS OF TRIVIALITIES 
The "hometown• release is target for those officers who 
feel that teo much time is spent on activities other than "the 
big picture.• Most often it is reduced to a distaste for the 
"glorification of individuals." 
This argument is proposed b7 one field grade officer: 
•I feel too much emphasis is placed upon individuals and 
net enough upon units and the Air ~erce as a whele. This is 
particularl7 true in local publications. The public is . 
cencerned, in the da7s of high taxes and international strift 
of a political nature, about what part their nearb7 base pl&TB 
in the national securit7 role rather than seme insignificant 
project completed b7 Captain So-and-So. I think it is highl7 
important to keep the influential citizens of a communit7 
highl7 informed of what their local Air Force unit is doing 
to further national securit7." 
Much of the criticism is, as previonsl7 stated, "pet peeves.• 
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In this classification are: 
"!oo much ribbon cutting and buildup of commanders at the 
expense sf the whole.• 
"!o counter bad publicit7 such as accidents.• 
"!o recognize &n7 source other than women's clubs and 
airmen's promotions.• 
"Save mone7 for more important projects Ar-wide b7 cutting 
down en, or out, PIO work; particularl7 such items as base 
newspapers.• 
"Restricted to little mere than pretecol." 
"Give the public, threugh the press, a knowledge ef the 
USAF and how it serves them. Pl~ up Ar rescues, disaster 
rslief, etc. Step the heading 'Captain--- PIO at=-- ArB 
sa7s Colonel --- Commander of the base just had triplets or 
shot a 69 at the Base Golf Course. •• 
LACK OY A GOOD !KLEVISION SHOW 
A source of anno7ance to m&n7 officers is the success of 
the Ar~ and particularl7 the BaV7 on television. It is felt 
that the Air Force has no program of comparable stature to 
reach the vast television audience. 
One positive expression of opinion was this: 
"More emphasis on selling the Air Force to important public 
figures. The best example I knew ef this is the conversion 
which General Le~ induced in Arthur Godfre7. It couldn't 
take too m&n7 like Godfre7 to sell the Air Force as it 
• 
should be sold." 
One suggestion came from an efficer candidate: 
"I believe the USAF should establish a radio-TV program in 
this (the San Antonio) area. Said program should be breadcast 
in English and Spanish for the benefit of all our citizens in 
this area. Perhaps music-t7Pe programs are good, but I 
believe that a panel-tTPe program answering questions &bout 
our Air Force weuld meet the needs and demands of the public.• 
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But aest eften, the Griticism was simpl7: 
"Arm7 bas 'Big Picture' 
"Navy bas 'Nav.r Log' and 'Silent Service' 
"Air Force has ~ !lng?" 
OTHER SKRVICBS BBTTER 
Altheugh the success en televisien ef ether services ia 
mest envied, seme officers feel that the ether services are 
better in other WBTS as well, 
Of the fourteen response• which indicated a preference 
for ether services' programs (not exclusivel7 television), ten 
favored the Navy, twe ~ve equal weight to the Arm7 and the 
Navy, and one favored the Arm7 (in the Celorade Springs, Colo-
rado, area), and ene: 
"I can't understand how, within present Cengreseienal and 
DOD (Department ef Defense) restrictiens, the USMC (Marine 
Corps) -- a branch ef the Bavy -- baa a better public 
relations pregram, or at least achieves more results, than 
the entire USAF." 
AIR COLLISIONS 
As of the peried of this surve7, June 1 threugh 10, 1958, 
there were no major news breaks in the newspaper• and ma~zines, 
such as a missile launching, aviation record er mnltiple-casualt7 
aircraft accident. 
The period did, however, follow the third Air Ferce-cemmercial 
airliner collisien within the 7ear te date. 
Of the officers who commented in this categorT, all were 
rated, or fl7ing, efficers, eleven field grade, ene cemp&nT grade. 
The comments were unanimous in disappointment: 
"I am disappointed that the USAF did not repl7 to the recent 
unfavorable publicitT it reeeii:ed concerning Air Traffic Control 
and mid-air collisions. The facts would disprove m&nT state-
ments made bT CAA, airlines and members of congress.• 
"Again the Air Force has taken it in the neck on the latest 
publicitT on AF-civilian accidents. Sever.al articles have 
appeared in leading magazines reflecting civil airlines views, 
somewhat distorted. Yet no Air Force views or position have 
come out to show that the Air Force has done mere to combat 
air collisions than aDT other agenc7." 
A check of the Reader's Guide~ Periodical Literature shows 
that three national magazines =- Life, Time and Q. ~. New• ~ 
World Report -- carried articles on the latest collision. 
Life.magazine's article was headlined "Crisia in the Sk7: 
another fatal mid-air crash starts a national debate.• The article 
described the collision as the fifth in nine 7ears, with a total of 
168 lives lost. It further said: 
"The basic cause is shown in the .ap below right: the 
incredibl7 crowded state of the U. S. air, plus the lack of a 
rigidl7 enforced traffic control e7stem to prevent militar.r 
planes from barging in and out of lanes used b7 the scheduled 
commercial airliners ••• 
"The CAA said it would re-route some airline flights and 
fence off the militar.r from congested lanes wherever possible,• 
A series ef photegraphs ef.the five crashes were captiened: 
"55 DIED on Nov. 1, '49, when a Bolivian AF P-JB fighter 
rammed into the rear of an Eastern AL DC-4 over Washington, 
D. c.• 
"5 DIED on Jan. Jl, 057, when a USAF F-89 hit wing of a 
Do~las Aircraft Co. DC-7. 
"47 DIED and 2 survived on Feb. 1, 1958, when AF transport 
and Navy P-24 patrol plane collided near Los Angeles.• 
"49 DIED en April 21 this Tear when a US Air Force F-100 jet 
interceptor hit the wing of a United Airlines DC~7 a- 21,000 
feet near Las Vegas, Nev. The colliaion occurred within a 
commercial air lane.• 
"12 DIED laat weekend ever Maryland when Air National Guard 
T-33 banked into fuselage of turbeprop Viscount which was 
letting down for a scheduled landing at Baltimere.•l 
~ magazine reported: 
"The Maryland crash -- the fifth mid-air military-airliner 
collision over the U.S. since mid-1949 -- laid on the line 
once again a scandalously serious problem of the US's crowded 
air space, In clear weather, military planes fly indiscrim-
inately on and through civil airw~e under Viaual Flight 
Rules. •2 
In the article carried ~ Q. ~. News and ~Report, it was 
laid: 
"Anether proposal, advanced ~ Representative Preston, would 
cut down on the number ef training and 1preficiency 9 flights 
by AF planes, It is pointed out that the Maryland and Nevada 
crashes involved military jets on training missions, The 
charge is heard, too, that m&nT jets are flown by pilots merely 
to qualif.r for flight pay,•3 
One officer summarized the Air Force's position: 
"The subject of air collisions is being handled badly. For 
example, in this area there was ne ceverage in the news 
defending the Air Force, The Air Force baa been maligned 
unjustly but the public doesn't knew it. Net one statement 
or article appears in the news presenting the Air Force 
position," 
And to this date, none has, 
LACK OF COMMAND SUPPORT 
As previously indicated, some commanders give full support to 
their public relations program, but unfortunately only as their own 
personal publicity agency. Often the cause il a misdirected public 
relations officer. It is generally agreed that the public relations 
program is no better or no worse than the commander permits. 
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Such a warning was voiced by this officer: 
"PolicTWise, Air Force Information Services lacks uniformit7, 
regularity and standard direction, mainly because of the whims 
of commanders, each of whom personally determines the amount of 
PR he wants -- in some cases, none at all -- and what kind. 
"The condition is made worse because of irregular -- from 
extremely talented to mediocre and poer -- personnel shunted 
into PR; this, ef course, reflecting on the cemmander. 
"Additionally, it seems the Air Force tries to establish PR 
by directives, which can only provide guidance, and that usu&ll7 
negative in character, whereas PR is, if net an art, certainly 
an employment that requires creativity and imagination fro• its 
practitioners. 
"In other words, AF public relations is more than public 
relations; rather, it should. be regarded and treated as a 
part of the basic education and indoctrination all Americans 
need te make them aware of the dangers they face and wbT air 
power is necesaary to their survival. 
"Finall7, air power cannot be any greater than the people 
who pay for it want it to be; therefore, they must have, as a 
basic requisite of American citizenship, a broader, deeper and 
more sympathetic understanding ef air power. This should be 
the aim and aspiration of the USAl public relatiens program; 
today it is not the case.• 
Although the regulations clearly spell out a commander'• 
responsibility fer the public relations program ef his command, 
one officer would carry the implementation ene step further: 
"The commander himself should be directed (and given 
authorit7) to conduct ~he program as he sees fit. Hia 
program should be judged (and he eo rated) by the results 
it achieves.• 
LACK OF EMPHASIS ON TRUTH 
On the one hand, there is a large group of officers who 
feel that persuasion is a necessary ingredient of effective 
public relations for the Air Jerce, 
The dilemma is that there is further an innate desire for a 
factual, truthful in the sense of "the truth, the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth" -- information to Air Force personnel as 
well as the public. 
The first case was stated this w~ b7 one: 
"USAF public relations, like all government informational 
activities, is robbed of initiative because planned programs 
lend themselves to charges that they are t~ing to 'aell' 
something rather than provide facts on which future judgments 
can be based. This means all USAF and other efforts stem 
from a starting point of 'disaster,' or 'pressure" or 
'misunderstanding' and are attempts to right a wrong or 
explain. This circumstance, at the root of what is ~rong, 
is one which will never chango in government press werk •• 
The latter caae is expresaed b7 another: 
"Public relations ahould strive (with greater emphasis) to 
educate or present te the people an henest portr&Tal of Ar 
objective• and the W&TS and meano b7 and wh7 the ebjectives 
are pursued. This should be baaed toward service personnel 
as well as the public. Net propaganda, but facta." 
SecuritY. !l'he release of informatien is not predicated 
selelT on quantitative and qualitative factors, but is further 
complicated b7 concern fer securit7 -- "the torment of secrec7." 
There is general agreement that securit7 considerations 
are prima~: 
"USAF public relations should be truthful and as objective 
as possible and never lose sight of the fact that it is a 
public service and that the securit7 of our count~ comes 
before service or individuals.• 
The dilemma here is where does "right to know" end and 
•need to know• or securit7 begia. How far can a public relations 
man go in awakening opinion without giving aid to the ene~. Oae 
officer thinks this w~: 
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•we take for granted a basic public understanding ef air 
power which simply does net exist, The (the general American 
publiG) publiG leeks ea us as \he panacaea for all the werld's 
ills without knewing either eur capabilities or limitatieas. 
In ~ epinien ~~ next te nething concerning air pewer as a 
whole is secret, including the fact that we occasienally lose 
some aircraft and kill Aeme crews -- cannet get into action in 
local war as fast as they think we cam -- and must use nuclear 
weapoas for maximum effect en small forces -- etc. The list ef 
secrets kept from the general American public is endless aad 
h ~ mind dead ~!" 
~ Decisien. It is neverthlesa felt by most efficers that 
the public, given both sides ef a question, will came to the right 
cenclushn. 
•we sheuld prize intellec\ual honesty above all else in eur 
public pronouncements and in dealing with our own military 
family ever,vwhere, e.g., if we tell a stery, we should tell 
both sides as fairly as we knew hew -- including the dis-
advantages of reenlisting as well as the advantages -- give 
eur people credit for their rather keen senses ef observa-ien 
and judgment.• 
MISCELLA.NEOUS 
Miscellaneeus comments were, fer the mast part, si~ly 
uncemplimentary: 
•we need a much better program.• 
"I do net thiak it :I.B effective,.• 
"It is aeml" 
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"I think it's been cheap, superficial and designed fer idieta,• 
"We prabably spend too .uch meney and reseurces en this 
activity as we do on so many peripheral areas ef Ar activity 
rather than directing such resources into fire power, traiaiag 
and supply and maintenaace auppert,• 
Interaal Inf•rmatiea. Many efficers believe that geed public 
relatiens begins with well infermed personae! of the tetal erganizatiea. 
Seme believe it ends there. 
"Jirst, a realistic pregram deea net seem te exist. Secoad, 
n• public relations program can be effective which impeses the 
extreme securitT restrictiens ~hat exist today. ~ primar,r 
interest is in ~he restrictiens imposed en the true public 
relations expert, the average efficer, who is in dailT centact 
with the public, yet whe e~e~ efficial!T discuss issues ef 
the day because ef restrictions and lack ef guidance.• 
"It is an individual AP officer problem to sell the AP to 
the public. • 
"PR is everTbodT's business. Not a specialist. We do no~ 
need a specialist.• 
Among the suggestion~ for bet~erment of the program is a more 
conscious and intensive indoctrination of personnel destined for 
overseas assignments. One mentions ~ in particular. 
Two officers suggested that the program be conducted bT civil 
service personnel, in order to assure careerists in the job and 
greater stabilitT of program. One suggested that civilian adver-
tieing agencies be eliminated in Air ~orce recruiting. 
Several officers suggest greater emphasis on public speaking 
engagements. 
A publication, such as a monthly newsletter to all officers, 
on current policies and top-level thinking is recommended by one 
officer. 
SUMMARY 
Lack of professionalism is considered the main inadequacT of 
the Air ~oroe's public relations program today; both in selection 
and in training of personnel and in the planning of the program. 
The program is viewed as not aggressive enough and lacking 
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in dynamism, Its practitioners are thought of as preoccupied with 
daily routine matters and "putting out fires,• when there exists a 
' 
real need for indoctrinating the public about air power and unit 
missions in relation to national securitT, 
A notable amount of env,r of other services programs is 
evident, particularl7 their success on television, 
Flying personnel are disappointed that the Air Force bas not 
given its side of the pict~e in the recent milit&rT-commercial 
airliner collisions, 
Command support is often misguided or non-existent, 
The dilemmas of facts vs prop&«anda and truth vs security are 
t:ontinuing ones, 
Generally, it is felt that not enough is being done to utilize 
officers and airmen as public relations representatives, 
l, Art;lcle in Life Magazine, •Crisis in the Sq,• Vol, 44, 
No. 22 (June 2, 1958), pp. 28-30. 
2. Article in Time Magazine, "Air Collisions,• Vol, LXXI, 
No. 22 (June 2, 1958), p. 17. 
3. Article in~. ~. News ~World Report Magazine, 
Vol. XLIV, No. 22 (MaT 30, 1958), PP• 25-26. 
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SUMMARY AND l!RCOMMENDATIONS 
Public relations in the Air Porce is particularl7 TUlnerable 
to criticism. 
First, public relations is in a vague area of quasi-profes-
sionalism. Most Air Force members realize that the performance of 
the job requires special training, and the accomplishmen- of the 
job has some merit. Public relations is not, in the e7es of Air 
Force officers, a science because too maD7 of its practitioners 
are not scientific. In the latter case, this attitude is evi-
denced b7 such statements as "every airman is a public relations 
man• and "after all, an7one can do it with a little training.• 
Second, public relations in the Air Force is susceptible to 
the same criticisms as public relations in civilian industry. 
"P?ess agentr.r• is assailed as a primary function, KanT officers 
would like to see the function broadened to include more salesman-
ship, Air power is thought to be marketable like a com.odit7 and 
sold with a cleverness of advertising techniques, 
Third, members of the Air Force have a curiousl7 detached 
view of the public relations of their organization, The7 can 
successfull7 take the position of members of the organization and 
cr1ticize failures to include themselves as objectives of public 
relations influence, On the other hand, they can detach themselves 
from the organization and criticize failures to win public support. 
J'inallT, aa with aD7 program that is difficult to measure in 
results, pubUc relations is evaluated by e110tions and feelings, 
Of~en evaluation of the whole program is baaed on biases, prejudices 
and "pet peeves,• 
As public relations becomes a greater science, it is important 
to note that many of the intangibles of criticism can be given a 
sound basis in fact and in principles, 
SUJIMARY 
One of the purposes of this stud;r is to compare preeent-d&T 
opinions concerning public relations with those found by Colonel 
Thor M, Smith in his study in 19.52, 
It is regrettable that a similar group of officers could not 
be so tested, However, it is evident from the results that the 
opinions held by officers of the Air War College do not differ 
greatly from those held by officers of all ranks tod&T, Further, 
to an;r one who holds the notion that there are two groups of 
officers in the Air Force -- first, the oldtimers who are rigid 
and inflexible, "old A~,· who will eventuall;r pass from the 
scene, and second, the young, rising •new Airman" of the coming 
missile age -- it must be self-evident that there is negligible 
difference in the attitudes of both groups \ovard public relations, 
if two such groups actually do exist, 
Colonel Smith reduced his findings to four noticeable problem 
1, Qualified personnel 
2, Prestige within the Air Force 
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J, Insufficient training of personnel 
4, Doctrines, missions and objectiveal 
One by one, let us examine the comparable attitudes existing 
to~. 
9n&lified Personnel, There can be no doubt that charges of 
a lack of profesaionaliam in Air lorce public relations, held bT 
Jo% of the officers, is due to a lack of qualified personnel in 
the information serrioes job, 
Certainly, strides have been made since 1952 in this area, 
The overhaul of the officer and ai~man classification system 
itself is reflected in the calibre and requirements expected of 
such specialists. 
In the service education of information officers, the 
program has had its ups and downs, Air rorce participation in the 
Armed Forces Information School at Port Slocum, New York, has 
dropped, since 1952, to only token participation toda7. The public 
relatione training in civilian institutions, available through 
application and selection by the UBAr Institute of Technologr, was 
dropped in 1952 and resumed in 1956, At the Boston Universit7 
School of Public Relatione and Communication•, where such selectees 
are aent, participation has fallen froa seven officers in the 1957-
1958 school 7ear to five officer• in the 1958-1959 school 7ear, A 
JO-~ intensiTe public relations course for information officers 
is conducted here eaGh summer. !he number dropped froa thirt7 in 
1957 to fifteen in 1958. 
Attendance at such schools is not necessarily equivalent ~o 
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qualification in the field, Yet aervice~supported training ia now 
on the ebb and consequentl7 reduces the posaibilit7 of qualificationo 
Prestige within ~!1t Porceo If aD7 gains can be shown since 
1952, it is in the area of prestigeo However, the laok of presti~e 
Gited by Colonel Smith in 1952 is open to questiono He considered 
an officer"s preference for the aaaignment aa BTDODTmOUS with its 
prestigeo Prestige and desirabilitT are not eynonymouso It is 
evidenced in this study that maD7 officer• shT from the posi~ion 
simplT because the7 do not feel themselves qualified for the jobo 
In such a case, it must be accepted that they feel that public 
relations does require certain training, even °personalit7 charac-
teristicso• 
The expectations of the public relations officer are so ~eat 
ae to encourage the belief that most officer• realize there is an 
important job to be done and the7 re~et that it ia not bein~ doneo 
Based on criteria of how i.portant is the job and not how 
enviable is the position, it .ust be concluded that public relations 
has preatigeo As in aD7 job, thoae who fail to do it well have 
little prestigeo 
Insufficient training ~ personntlo There persists the belief 
that airmen are not "get~ing the word" on high level policy and 
decisionso Ineffectiveneea in thia area is at its greateeto 
B.r regulation, information service• is granted "importance 
equal to that of the operational mission,• Probabl7 this should be 
realia~icallT interpreted as &DT job worth doing at all is worth 
doiDg wello Yet, it appears inconceivable that student officers 
and officer candidates are exposed to so little, if anT, knowledge 
about the information serTices program. 
The overwhelming response that no public relations training 
is included in their schools is evidence that either such training 
does not exist or such training is not rec,ognized. In either case, 
there is room for improvement. 
Those officers who do acknowledge exposure to public relations 
training are evenly divided in their evaluations between good and 
poor. 
It is important to note that the majority of such officers 
and officer candidates do desire instruction in public relations, 
and that the percentage is greater than in 19.52. 
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Minions, ,doctrines and ob.lectives. As in 19.52, it is apparent 
that the majority of officers feel that the missions, doctrines and 
objectives of public relation• are not well understood. 
To give hearing to the minority viewpoints, it ia evident 
that the word "doctrine" is unclear. 
The comments indicate that clarification of mission is 
required. Is it to inform or to persuade, or both? A large 
percentage want information, but more of it, and a better calibre 
of it. An equally large number want more persuasive-tTPe information. 
Objectives have been reduced simply in the opinions of most 
officers. There is a desire, almost craving, for public approval, 
recognition and understanding of air power, the Air Force, its 
units and ita men. Most are not certain that these can be achieved 
merely through information to the public. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Mission, The mission of Air Force information needs to be 
well defined, in accordance with its capabilities and. its limit&-
tions. 
In 1954, the overall Information Services Objective was 
stated: 
"Earn and maintain the respect and confidence of the Amer-
ican people bT creating within the Air Force a continuing 
sense of reaponsibilitT for the securitT of the natio~~d 
aocounting of stewardship over men, mone7 and material.n2 
This objective would be a great one for a commander and his 
entire staff, not just the information officer, 
The information program can earn and maintain the respect of 
the American people onlT so long as the organization which it 
represents is wortbT. Wo~thiness cannot be created b7 an informa-
tion program. 
From the top, worthiness is created b7 integritT and direc-
tion. Yet each man must bring to his job an integritT that a 
public relations program cannot create, or even develop, but onlT 
encourage, 
It must be done in terms that the "desirable" man in the Air 
Force can understand. In some instances it must be •talking down• 
and in m&nT instances it will be •talking up,• There can be no 
generalization of the •average" man, onl7 of "desirable" ones, 
The mission of information should be defined so that the 
commander and the airman understands it. And the information 
officer must understand it too. 
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Nature ~his activitr. The information services officer 
needs to know whether his objective is to inform or to persuade. 
If it is to persuade, the majoritT of those who nov call them-
selves Information Services Officers must be eliminated. 
To perform all that is expected of him the Information 
Services Officer would need to be a management consultant, a 
ps7chologist, a sociologist, as well as a communications expert. 
To perform all the expectations is an unrealistic goal. 
However, relief from these expectations cannot be taken 
for granted, A societT of experts in communications persuasion 
is needed. The7 must be located in an echelon high enough to 
permit full staffing when required. TheT must be talented as 
well in directing the less qualified at lower echelons. As 
suggested u,r one officer, such a function could best be performed 
as an area activit7, rather than for each unit or base. 
Plans. Considerable ineffectiveness is resulting from lack 
of planning at the operating level. In the enmeshment with da7 b7 
day affairs, little consideration is given to overall program 
planning, The result is the frequent charge that public relations 
officers are consumed with countering bad publicit7. 
Positive and detailed direction is needed. Although reports 
are generallT looked upon with distaste, it appears that the base 
officer needs to plan ahead and report to higher headquarters 
for review and assistance to assure that proper attention is being 
given to foreseeable areas of conflict and that steps are being 
taken to win public understanding and support. 
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Personnel. Continued screening of all personnel must be 
maintained. It should be the polic7 of commanders to leave the 
information services office unfilled rather than permit dis-
interested, uns7mpathetic officers to perform the duties. 
!rainiijg. Every opportunitT available should be exploited 
to further the interests of public relations. !he most pressing 
need of the moment is to institute instruction in public relations 
in the Air War College, Air Command and Staff College, Squadron 
Officers School, Reserve Officers Training Corps program and 
wherever else practicable. 
Such training cannot be adequatel7 handled b7 civilian 
guest speakers. In this area, more needs to be known about the 
public relations objectives and methods of implementation than 
what the public thinks about the Air 7orce, !he latter can be 
more extensivel7 and accuratelT obtained through other means. 
Acknowledgment of the limitations of the program as well is 
needed b7 senior officers now. 
Conclusion, In 1950 and 1951, Mr. J. A. R. Pimlott studied 
public relations in the United States with special attention to 
government public relations. 
His findings have immediate use for the Air 7orce: 
•CarefullT used, surve7 methods can add to the data which is 
relevant in settling polic7 and shaping its administration, and 
provide an index to its impact when it has been introduced. 
The7 are particularl7 well adapted for use in planning and test-
ing the effectiveness of public relations programs.~ 
At present, this tool is not available nor utilized at the 
operating level. 
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"Modern techniques of mass information and persuasion are 
powerful tools, and all who seek to ac~uire or maintain power 
in a democracy must make use of them. •. 
"Like other tools, public relations can be misued. It is 
most likel;y to be misused when the stakes are the highest; and 
the danger to society I1J8.7 be g:rave. •·5 
Public relations in the military service is not like public 
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relations in civilian industry, Militar,r capability is not a product 
that can be marketed, Success of a military program cannot be meas-
ured in dollars and cents of profit, of superiority over other nation's 
air forces and certainly not in the amount of appropriation from 
Congress, 
Rather, mil:l.taey public relations can and should achieve 
certain things, and in a priority order: -- public approval of the 
Air Force, recognitions of its problems, of its accomplishments, 
understanding of its limitations and prestige for its men, 
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APPENDIX A 
PUBLIC RELATIONS ~UESTIONNAIBE 
The following questionnaire is designed to assess the effective-
ness of the Air 7orce Information program since its reorganization 
five years ago and to plan future requirements. 
Your name is not required but your honest opinion is. There 
are no right or wrong answers; your personal evaluation is requested. 
1. What is your opinion of the USAF public relations program? 
(Check one. ) 
- (1) 
- (2) 
- (3) 
Superior 
Adequate 
Inferior 
2. What has been your personal contact.(within the past few years) 
with the USAF public relations program? (Cheek all that apply,) 
- (1) 
- (2) 
- (3) 
- (4) 
Commander or staff member with PR responsibilities 
Received PR bulletins or guidance 
Attended schools, conferences or lectures on PR 
None of above 
3. In your opinion, are the missions, objectives and doctrine of 
the USAF public relations clearly defined and understood by Al 
officers? (Check one,) 
_ (1) Yes 
_ (2) No 
~ (3) Don"t know 
4. What is your opinion of the most recent public relations officer 
under your command or close observation? (Cheek one.) 
- (1) 
- (2) 
- (3) 
- (4) 
Well qualified 
Adequate 
Inadequate 
Don't know 
5, What would be your personal reaction to a high level public 
relations assignment? (Check one.) 
- (1) 
- (2) 
- (3) 
- (4) 
Seek it od 
Accept it passively 
Avoid it if possible 
No comment 
6, Do you believe that public relations instruction should be in-
cluded in the curriculum of the college, school, or acade~ 
that you are now attending, or laat attended? (Check one.) 
_ (1) Yes 
_ (2) No 
_ (J) No comment 
7. What is your opinion of the public relations instructor in 
the college, school or acade~ you are now attending, or last 
attended? (Check one.) 
_ (l) Good 
_ (2) Poor 
_ (J) None 
8. How do you feel about the emphasis on public relations in 
the instruction you received in the college, school or acad-
e~ you are attending, or last attended? (Check one.) 
_ (l) Too liiWlh emphasis 
___ (2) Too little emphasis 
_ (J) Enongh emphasiB 
_ (4) None 
9. Where do you feel that public relations should appear on an 
organizational chart? (Check one.) 
___ (l) Personal staff of commander 
___ (2) Under Adjutant (or Administration) 
_ (J) Under Personnel 
_ (4) Under Operations 
_ (5) Other (Specify):---------------
- (6) No comment 
10. What do you consider the most important duty of a public 
relations officer? 
11, Do you have any comments that you would like to make about the 
USAF public relations? 
PERSONAL INlORMATION (lor statistical purposes): 
Grade: _ l'ield Grade 
_ Comp9.D7 Grade 
___ !cads~ Student 
Officer Trainee 
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Age: 
_Under 2.5 
-2.5 - 3.5 
-36 "'4.5 
46 = .5.5 
_Over .5.5 
Source of Commission: _ Academy 
Years in Service: 
Rated 
___ Aviation Cadet 
ocs 
Direct Commission 
ROTC 
Other 
_'Onder .5 
.5 = 10 = 11 = 1.5 
16 ,= 20 
Over 20 
Non=Bated 
6.5 
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A.PPDDIX:S 
COMPLETE TA:BULATIOW Ol RESPONSES 
Command Jield Compe.DT Of:l'icer Air War 
& Staff Grade Grade Cand- Colle~e College idates (19.52 Question Part ~.58 lr-.52 W:lOJ 11=91 W=6.5 
* 
f. # f. # f. 
* 
f. # f. 
1. (l) 4 1 l 2 2 l 6 7 0 0 (2) 117 Jl 37 71 82 80 6.5 71 28 43 (J) 227 60 9 17 18 17 20 22 J4 .52 (4) 9 2 .5 l l l 0 0 J .5 
2. (1) 61 17 19 J7 ll ll J _.3 24 J7 (2) 73 20 19 J7 28 27 23 2.5 Jl 48 (J) J4 6 9 17 17 17 1.5 16 6 9 (4) 18J 4J 19 J7 55 SJ .5.5 60 19 29 
J. (1) 11 J 7 1J 18 17 22 24 4 6 (2) 28.5 80 34 65 61 .59 31 J4 57 88 (J) .59 16 11 21 24 23 38 42 J .5 (4) J 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
4. (1) 40 11 26 .50 17 17 8 9 1.5 2J (2) 92 26 17 JJ 27 26 22 24 26 40 (J) 12.5 3.5 J 5 .5 .5 8 9 1.5 23 (4) 98 27 6 ll .54 .52 .53 .58 9 14 (.5) .5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
s. (1) .58 16 11 21 20 19 39 43 J .5 (2) 110 31 14 27 29 28 26 29 9 14 (J) 120 JJ 23 44 JO 29 6 7 46 71 (4) 70 19 4 7 24 23 20 22 2 J 
6. (1) 316 88 JJ 6J 76 74 81 89 J6 55 (2) 29 8 1.5 29 20 19 4 4 29 4.5 
(J) 13 J 4 7 7 7 6 7 0 0 
?. (l) 67 20 2 4 9 9 14 1.5 Wo' (2) 48 14 9 17 8 8 ll 12 Applicable (J) 231 63 4o 77 86 8J 76 83 (4) 12 J l 0 0 0 0 0 
8. (1) 2 1 J 5 0 0 0 0 Wot (2) 199 .56 19 .37 32 Jl JO JJ Applicable (J) 107 29 9 17 2J 22 16 18 (4) .50 14 20 39 48 47 4.5 49 
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Tabulation of Responaes (Continued) 
Command lield Compe.ny Officer Air War 
& Staff Grade Grade Cand= College 
College ida tea (1952) 
Question Part I!T"'.358 liB 52 li"'l03 I!T8 91 NIB65 
I f. I f. # ., I f. # f. 
9. (1) 321 90 42 81 ?O 68 64 70 
(2) 5 1 3 5 12. 12 9 10 (3) 2 l 1 2 7 7 10 11 (4) 4 1 0 0 7 7 0 0 
(5) 10 2 1 2 1 1 3 3 (6) 16 3 s 9 6 5 5 6 
(See page 11 for explanation of coding) 
Question 1& Parts~ 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
Air Command # 6 16 99 52 112 33 27 
& Staff College ., 2 5 28 15 31 9 8 
Jield Grads # l 3 13 6 14 9 6 
f. 2 5 25 11 27 17 11 
CompaDT Grade # 2 12 32 16 25 6 13 
., 2 11 30 15 24 6 12 
Officer # 2 5 14 42 6 4 18 
Candidates f. 2 5 16 46 7 4 20 
' 
No 
Question ll Parts: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Comment 
Air Command R • 3.3 12 25 26 13 11 8 11 3 4 110 
& Staff College li'=R••13 12 s 5 3 6 3 0 3 0 
Field Grade R 2 8 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 .3 17 
li=R 2 3 1 0 3 0 0 0 2 1 10 
CompaDT Grade R 5 6 3 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 39 
li=R 1 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 32 
Officer 1 3 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 78 
Candidate a 
-
Total: 57 so 37 31 22 19 14 12 10 8 339 
• Bated Total Comments 272 
•• ll'on=llated Total No Comment~ 
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COMMEWTS TO QUESTION ll 
Air Command and Staff College, Rated Officers 
1. Favorable: 2 
Improving!! 
It appears to be improving. 
2. Favorable, but -- : 3 
The program has some excellent points but generall7 seems 
indefinite and spotty. 
I think that our effort is good, as regards intent and 
quantity, but that it is stereotyped, non-committal and untimely 
in light of the importance and interest of some areas or incidents 
of the moment. 
Basically, the average USAJ program has been high-powered 
and effective. However, at field level, the inexperience of PR 
staff degrades the US!l as a whole. 
' ' 3. Lack of emphasis on facts: 4 
In event of air crashes or aQT incident (especially when 
USAF and civilian personnel or property is concerned), the inform-
ative service• should strive to make sure that the actual facts 
are presented for public consumption. Good relations with local 
news media can benefit this project. 
USAF public relations should be truthful and aa objective 
as possible and never lose sight of the fact that it is a public 
service and that the security of our country comes before service 
or the individual. 
Clarify the information and keep it factual. 
Public relations should strive (with greater emphasis) to 
educate or present to the people an honest port~al of AF objec-
tives and the w~s and means by.and wbT the objectives are pur-
sued. This should be based toward service personnel as well as 
the public. Not propaganda but facta. 
4. Lack of professionalism: 33 
The civilian community does not fully know or understand the 
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necessity for a particular Air lorce operationo Also, in many 
instances a very junior officer, who, although capable, does not 
possess the overall experience to accomplish this v:l,1\&l job in a 
highly successful mannero 
USAl should contract for topside PRO, assign qualified people 
at operating level to feed info into contractor and to make timely 
local releases, 
Use professional civil service personnel, not unqualified 
officers trying to establish themselves in government, etco 
In ~ opinion there is little public relations program at 
base levelo Generally, the people assigned as PIO have it as an 
additional duty and can put little effort into ito Let's get a 
program and the people to run it that will "beat the drum" for the 
Air lorce at every chanceo 
This duty is too often aasigned as additional duty to non-
competent personnelo Too often Public Relations personnel will 
write an article on a certain area and not have it ok'd by a 
specialist in that area prior to publication. The result is that 
much misinformation is released. 
I have not observed, within the last six years, 
qualified in public relations assigned to this dutyo 
officer could have accomplished much more. 
an officer 
A qualified 
Personnel assigned to this field should qualif,y by succesa-
ful completion of an adequate period of training. 
Yes!!! I think it should be more professional and more 
aggressive! 
Too often ISOs are bootlicking, publicity seekers who put 
their COs and their own pictures in papers and seldom indicate a 
knowledge of 'heir unit's mission. 
(1) 
(2) 
dator,y. 
More qualified personnel are needed. 
Training in schools in public relations should be man-
(3) Language courses should be made mandatory for personnel 
who are assigned to foreign countries where the English language; 
is not spoken. 
(4) Base commanders ihould be given mandatory courses in 
public relations. 
PIO officers should be familiar with national objectives and 
USAl policiea and doctrine so that news releases, article• and 
interviews will all be consistent. 
Yea! Because of the extremelY high results of the USAl public 
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relations program which are demanded today, a careful and intelli-
gent screening should be mandator,r before an officer is placed into 
a public relations position. Too many officers are "shoved" into 
the program and the results frequently show it, unfortunate as that 
may be. The low calibre non-productive officers now in the program 
should be removed immediately, with especial emphasis on those who 
consiatently drink too much,~ dutY as well aa off! 
Too much misinformation is allowed into print by ill-informed 
PlOs and local writers. 
Not professional, 
PIOs are releasing news items as an authority when they are 
not qualified to technically explain the true A1 position. Example: 
"The crew was flying blind." On 5 June 58, on CBS, Douglas ~dwards' 
program about B-52 training was certainly a poor news release. 
Proper screening of the film and the stor,r would have averted such 
a debacle. 
We need a trained corps of officers (total) who are trained 
toward public relations. 
lver,r lieutenant PIO officer who receives. an asaignment gets 
far more publicity (including pictures) than the average Colonel 
and General Officer. wnyT I believe their efforts should be 
channeled to more timely releases and articles on keeping the public 
and the military informed. 
• lull use doeen't appear to be made of psychology in planning 
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press releases. For example, the headlines pertaining to the recent 
KC=l35 flight from Japan to the Azores went something like, "!!~aile 
in Jet Distance ~light.• That was poor publicity for an outstanding 
accomplishment! If the info, released initially, had indicated the 
goal was Japan to east coast US, even though the real goal was to 
Spain, then the headlines would have read, "AF Tankers Bxceed Goal 
in Distance Flight.• The AF is too honest and straightforward ia 
most information releases. Within reason, they should manipulate 
releases to create the impression we desire. 
Yes: This is a job for many high calibre requisites which 
include education, well rounded experience in military life, 
diplomacy, speaking ability, tao-, and rank equivalent to the other 
etaff members at the command level concerned. 
Assign more competent officers to this duty, frequently I 
have observed officer• aaaigned to this duty because there ~' 
nothing else to do with them, 
It has been my observation that much too U~Ue emphasia is 
given public relations by most commanders {at base or lower levels) 
and that officers assigned duty in the specialty &re generally not 
trained or qualified aa PR men. 
I feel that the entire public has little knowledge of the 
Air Force, its operations and support of national policy. Better 
trained personnel would greatly solve this problem -- also more 
specific guidance by the Department of Defense and U. S, Air Force. 
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Proper and extensive education on public relations techniques 
and on Air Force objectives and goals should be the minimum require-
ment for public relations officers. 
I feel that operationally qualified pilots should serve rela-
tively short tours with info units. They should be brought in after 
demonstrating outstanding ability in the field -- so they can talk 
and present their views in an authentic and realistic manner. This 
approach should give a more realistic presentation to the public. 
PIOe who are isolated from the field and who know nothing about 
aircraft can't do the job right. Kxample-- winner of Bendix race, 
etc. 
I personally feel that each base should have a highly qual-
ified -- educated in PR -- officer of field grade rank or civilian 
as direct representative of the commander. This man should be a 
member of AP, UP, INS, etc. 
The public relations office at ~ last two duty stations (oae 
was a major command headquarters) aeemed to be definitely overstaffed, 
They spent more time getting out local goaaip columns than anything 
else, I firmly believe that the basic mission of USAF public rela-
tions officers should be that specified in ~estion 10 above (to get 
timely, accurate, truly informative information to the public). For 
example, whereas the ar~ and the navy are getting the word acroaa 
to the public on their misaile programs, the average American citi-
zen doesn't aeem to realize that the Air Force has a program for 
missiles. Also, why can't we, or don't we, get the word out quick-
ly on Air Force accidenta? Finally, and moat important, public 
relations officer• ahould enthusiastically inform -- even teach --
the American public the need for adequate defense. 
Yea -- have the PIO exert more effort toward championing the 
roles and missions of the AF and discontinue writing about them-
selves; the preponderance of individual news releases in the AF 
Times, for instance, deals with transfers and assignment• of PIOa. 
~ opinion is based strictly on some of the sorrr types I have 
observed aa PIOs. Those who were rated could not or would not fly 
any more than neoeaaary to receive their flight pay. I have never 
seen ~climb into a tactical jet aircraft. 
Officers aaaigned to public relations positions generally 
require more training. 
USAF public relations program could be improved by profeaaion-
al (career minded military) peraonnel who could recognize the 
implications of a phrase such as Rfail~Safe" before it is used for 
public consumption. 
Concentrate on public relations and not so much on stressing 
assignment of ISO officer in the AF !imes (most every week a picture 
is included of an ISO officer). In addition, have a professional 
ISO program to obtain people for the ISO slots. 
(1) Get away from the newapaper approach. 
(2) PR is a science and involves more than ability to repeat 
news and news events. 
(J) Prepare PR officers with public relations, industrial 
realtions, psychology of personality, and other courses that apply 
to a good public relations program. Further, a point missed in 
the AF public r,elaUons starts from within -- .Q21 without the 
organization. The key to the program is having the members aell 
the program. 
Part of the PIO's duty should be to analyze public opinion, 
anticipate if posaible trends of opinion, and plan to slant their 
public relations program according to this analysia~ 
S. Lacks aggressiveness, dynamism, emphasis: 25 
Only that through more emphasia on the program that more 
awarenesa might be felt by all. 
There isn"t enough emphasis on grass roots work. 
Should be intensified program, centrally controlled by Head,-
q_uartera USAF. 
It seems to me that the USAF public relations program is not 
as dynamic and flexible as it should be. !here seems to be a lack 
of balance between aggressive actions and defensive actions, with 
respect to information and education provided to both the military 
personnel and the affected publics. 
I feel that the USAF should have a positive and progreaaive 
public relations program. One that would be designed to educate 
the public by providing instruction and guidance to the reporters 
and publishers of newspapers and magazines, so that their analysis 
and interpretations of military actiona and accompl'iahmenta ~ be 
in the light of solid knowledge and background, through such a 
program. The public would receive factual and intelligent inform-
ation, rather than news baaed on impressions, bias and/or opinions. 
I would like it to be more active and dynamic, to tell the 
American public and the world what we are, what we can and cannot 
do, and our position in the national picture. 
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I believe we should make an effort to keep the public better 
informed of our activities and make a strong effort to counter any 
propaganda that puts the Air Yoree in a bad light. 
Too restricted. Not enough emphasia, planned, or unplanned, 
by the Air Force. 
Needs to be much more aggressive. 
I feel that it should be re-vitalized. 
The Air Force needs an aggressive and dynamic public relations 
program. 
More dynamism! 
More emphasis should be placed on an effective, active public 
relations program. Information officers should be selected more 
carefully and given more authority and responsibility. Admittedly, 
~ knowledge and reaction to AF public relations is poor, but I 
consider the public's must be even poorer. I think our present 
information program is very inadequate. 
In ~ opinion, USAF public relations has been consistently 
weak, ineffective and not conducive to a public understanding of 
the Air Force, The Air Yorce is in need of an aggressive and 
highly objective PIO program which will adequately place the Air 
Force in the public favor and influence it to support the USAl as 
our strongest defense arm. 
What little we have appears to be rather ineffective and 
mostly from the defensive. We should have an aggressive public 
realtions and education program which calls a spade a spade and 
doesn't sacrifice the military interest and viewpoint to private 
interests. 
Could be much more aggressive than what it is. 
Expand 100-fold the program of officers returning to their 
high schools and colleges for graduation speeches. Encourage 
greater participation of all AF members in Toastmasters Clubs. 
This subject is treated too lightly throughout the AF. 
This program needs much more emphasis. 
Why do we continue to publish statements of intent, ie, 
KC-lJS flight from Japan to North Africa and then publicize our 
failure to attain our objective. The failure to reach our ob-
jective places the Air Foree in a poor light when actually the 
entire mission could have been a feather in our cap had it been 
properly handled. This is but one of many examples, others occur 
almost daily, ie, Cape Canaveral launchings. 
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In the past they have not taken advantage of the opportunities 
to exploit the Air Force, 
Entirely too modest! 
I do not feel that the USAF public relations has consistently 
received the attention such an important area should, 
It seems to me we are not fully exploiting this area, 
This is one of the most unappreciated areas of activity in the 
USAF, Experience has shown time and time again that the American 
people, when informed, are an extremely logical group, Therefore 
I feel that if we do an adequate job of informing them, we will 
find all the support we need for our program, 
Why don't the public relations officers send write-ups to a 
man"s hometown newspapers when there is something favorable to 
report, ie, promotions? 
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6. Lack of command support: J 
Commanders do not put enough emphasis on this program. This 
includes all levels, 
Intermediate (and apparently top) commanders place too little 
emphasis on PR. With one exception, all PR officers I have knowa 
have been indifferent officers with little potential for advaacement 
and limited understanding of the mission, Generally speaking, they 
have been glad-hand types that have very little lubstantial military 
background, 
All commanders should have an active (not passive) public 
relations program, All PROs should be intimately acquainted with 
releasable information. Releases concerning potentially adverse 
news should be handled quickly and carefully, 
7. Other services better: 8 
Panel after the Navy-Civilian lobby. 
Pattern the USAF program after that of the Nayy, This is 
vital! l 
I, in comparing it to the A~ or the Navy's PR, think it is 
very poor. It is poorly organized, bas no teeth and only lights 
up the commander of a base instead of the base and its members, 
The attitude should be to "sell the Air Force" and not just what 
the AF is doing, The public should be proud of its members, I 
don't really believe that it is. There is very little prestige in 
the service today, I feel that a good looking uniform would go a 
long w~ to this prestige. This I believe should be brought out 
in their relations with the US. This PR is a two-way track. Yrom 
the public to the Air Force and from the Air Force to the public. 
Check with the Navy. Our public relations program does not 
appear to be strongly guided from Headquarters USAY. 
Do we need a counter to the TV series, Navy Log? I.e., l!ravy 
minded youth. The way the Ar~ and Navy capitalize on each missile 
accomplishment indicatas the public may look to them for aero-
space leadership, 
I can't understand how, within present Congressional and DOD 
restrictions, the USMC ( a branch of the Navy ) has a better public 
relations program, or at least achieves more results, than the 
entire USAF. 
I believe we should copy the Navy program in this field. 
8, Lack of a good television show: 11 
Extremely weak. Nation has a very poor concept of what the 
Air Force mission is and what its objectives are. Public has no i-
dea of what SAC, ADC, etc., do. Air Force needs programs for 
public orientation via media of TV and radio. Navy has it --
Navy Log, Silent Service, etc. 
More Air Power TV shows. Which should be more realistic and 
educational, Air Power speakers. Talented and competent to in-
form small groups on our duties and responsibilities. Emphasize 
our relationship to communi\ies, local governments and nation. 
Put more emphasis on program through use of TV, radio aad 
pres so 
Behind the A~ and Navy in many ~s. Could use a good 
national TV program that people woUld watch and understand, 
I believe USAF sponsored programs on TV, radio, etc., should 
be presented to the public to define the threat, organizatioa 
necessary to ~eter the threat and within some limitation how the 
force is employed. 
More TV programs selling the career of the Air Force, A 
program set up to show the Air Force in its infant stage and what 
the future will be like -- a bigger picture. 
A TV program at least as good as the "Silent Service• is 
necessary and important. Develop a apace age program which will 
educate the general public and create interest by 'he youth of 
America. 
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We need more TV and radio programs similar to Navy Log, A~ 
"The Big Picture,• etc. 
More emphasis on selling the Air Force to important public 
figures, The best examnle I know of this is the conYersion which 
General LeMay induced in Arthur Godfrey, It couldn't take too 
many like Godfrey to sell the Air Force as it should be sold. 
AF needs a TV program such as Navy Log. 
A~ has "Big Picture• 
Navy has "Navy Log" and "Silent Servic:e" 
Air Force has .§g. !!Jl&? 
More public info should be advanc:ed, 
9. Air Collisions: 11 
I am disappointed that the USAF did not repl7 to the recent 
unfavorable publicity it rec:eiYed c:oncerning Air Traffic Control 
and mid-air collisions. The facts would disprove many statements 
made by CAA, airlines and members of congress. These facts are 
available at Headquarters USAF (AFOOP) and should have been 
published in a news story showing amount of money USAr pays for 
Air Traffic Control, number of USAF aircraft using the "commercial 
airways• (6~), etc. 
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Yes. The PR program seems to be behind on major issues, The 
Sonic Boom problem was a major public topic before any (and suitable) 
information was released, Again the Air Force has taken it in tl!e 
neck on the latest publicity on AF-ciYilian accidents. Several 
articles have appeared in leading magazines reflecting ciYil 
airlines views, somewhat distorted. Yet, no Air Force Yiews or 
position have come out to show that the AF has done more to combat 
air collision than any other agency. More public relations iafo 
should be released to the press at !2R level. 
Recent air collisions have caused much erroneous informatica 
to appear before the public, e.g,, ciYil airways belong to the 
airlines; that we are completely at fault in these recent inci-
dents, etc. All of this shows that the public is being misled. 
The subject of air collisions is being handled badly, For 
example, in this area there was ao coverage in the news defending 
the Air Force, The Air Force has been maligned unjustly but -the 
public doesn"t know it. Not one statement or artic:le appeared in 
the news presenting the Air Forc:e position. The Navy has numerous 
and continuous programs before the Public, ie, Silent Service, 
Navy Log, etco, but the Air Force has none. 
Obviously we need some harder words to the ciYil air t7PeB 
in relatioa to the use of air apace, 
If a better job of PR had been done, I feel that the public, the 
newspapers and the magazines would know that "civil airw~s" were 
not developed for the sole use of United, American or TWA. WhT 
are we not attempting to correct this misconception? 
Stop sitting on your bands! E,g. The Air ~orce has suffered 
a tremendous loss of prestige over the air traffic problem. The 
airlines have placed all the blame on the Air ~orce. 
The public now seems to receive unimportant and insignificant 
or poorly explained information. The public is misinformed about 
many matters such as air safety in a way which has placed the 
USA~ in an undesirable posiUon. The misinformation is Rot clari-
fied or corrected. 
In the recent air collisions, Al public relations have been 
totally inadequate. The public has been left with the impression 
that: one, the Al is always in the wrong; two, that the flying 
done by the Al is unimportant and has little or no importance as 
there is no great threat at present. 
It seems to me we are not fully exploiting this area. An 
example of this is the black-eye the Air ~orce received aa a result 
of the recent mid-air crashes. The public believes the militar.r is 
alone responsible for these. 
Al does not take sufficient action: . (.a) to present air power 
to the public through radio, television and other news media, and 
(b) Al does not take appropriate action to show the Al side of 
derogatory iRformation and recriminations from other agencies, 
ie, airline pilots association, commercial airlines, etc., concern-
ing mid-air collisions, aircraft accidents, and MATS operations. 
10, Overemphasis of trivialities: 1) 
Too much time is spent on trivial business, ie, news of 
individuals instead of explaining the role of the Al in national and 
international affairs, 
Horatio Alger success stor,r. Absence of limitatioms lulls 
public to sleep. Too much ribbon cutting and buildup of commanders 
at expense of whole. 
Quite often our programs are established to counter bad 
publicity, such as accidents" Good informatiTe programs would 
prepare the public to accept some of our unfortunate inciden\s, 
Much of the public relations program is made up of "news 
releases• which are written to make hero of an iadividnal. We 
need to sell the Air Force, not indiTidnals. 
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1 feel it can use more emphasis on really worthwhile programs 
that will pay dividends. How about using advertising people to 
tell us how, when, where and what to present to be the most effec~ 
tive. 
Give the public, through the press, a knowledge of the USAF 
and how it serves them. Play up Ar rescues, disaster relief, etc. 
Stop the heading, Capt ~~- PIO at ~--ArB says Col ~~~, Commander 
of the base just had triplets or shot a 69 at the Base Golf Course. 
USAF PR always seems to be behind the fact. They never take 
or actively present views on any subject other than routine 
promotions of airmen. I think we are extremely poorly represented 
in PR, particularly in anything in the least controversial or 
current. PR is the least aggressive of any field to ~ knowledge. 
The average PR section does not seem to recognize any news source 
other than women's clubs and airmen's promotions. We are being 
done a disservice in avoiding current and controversial matters 
representation by PR. I think our views should be presented con-
currently with our critics. 
I feel too much e~sis is placed upon individuals and not 
enough upon units and the Air Force as a whole. This is particu-
larly true in local publications. The public is concerned, ia 
the days of high taxes and international strife of a political 
nature, about what part their nearby base plays in the national 
security role rather than some insignificant project completed 
by Captain So-and~So. I think it is highly important to keep the 
influential citizens of a community highly informed of what the 
local air force unit is doing ~o further national security. 
Most PIOs only try to keep the high ranking officers' names 
before the public so these commanders are well known aad will be 
promoted. We need less of this type as well as the news from the 
Officers Wives Clubs. Notice the Air Force Times always carries 
pictures and news of newly appointed PIOs. I could care leas &bout 
this. Let's sell the Air Force and its missioa. 
Save money for more important projects Al-wide by cutting 
down on, or out, PIO work; particularly such items as the base 
papers. A good example of this is the waste by numbers printed 
and material of the local Maxwell paper. This time and effort 
personnel -~ could certainly be used by the A1 to a greater 
advantage elsewhere. 
I think we are too fadist conscious and talk about the sea-
sational -- ~ folks, relatives all have the opinion that we are all 
a bunch of publicity seekers. I think we should publicize the hard 
working element, etco I do not intend to imply or minimize the 
accomplishment of noteworthy events, but I think we are all imbued 
with the sensational and forget the working element. I belieTe that 
?8 
wa should. have a better program to inform our men on what is 
communism, democracy, capitalism, etc., implications and responsi-
bilities in the Cold War. I know we have programs to do some of 
this, but generally they are minimized or given with the captive 
audience, or "I don"t give a damn" approach, Maybe USAF teams 
could present this base by base. 
Public relations, in ~ opinion, has been allowed to deter-
iorate into an 8 to 5 mimeograph operation instead of "damn the 
hours, let 0s get the story out now and correctly" type of operation, 
The present program at local and base level spends too much 
time on publicizing the "antics• of airplanes and awards to civil 
servants and not enough time in selling the important contribution 
of each local base to air power and to national security. !he 
program does not credit the public with the ability to comprehend 
these things and therefore sticks too close to •amazing" them 
rather than really informing them. 
11. The Big Picture: 26 
The General Public should be more aware of the activities and 
objectives of the USAF, It is the responsibility of every member 
of the USAF to actively promote the interests and objectives of 
the Air Force, 
Public relations is a real business -- imperative to the 
security of our nation and the formation and maintenance of our 
air arm. The Air Force needs to counter the sensationalist news 
peddlers" caustic and half-truths' releases, The military should 
openlT rebut •sensational" charges against the military personnel 
and organizations, Teach reporters to report military news with 
full knowledge of the problem, situation, or incident. 
All Air Force officers should be made aware of the miaaions 
and doctrine of the public relations program, Although public 
relations was touched on in Command and Staff School, the full 
importance of public relations was not emphasized, 
The assignment of public relations officer at most bases 
seems to be an added duty. How about one job for the PR? --
Sell the Ar from top to bottem. 
Yes -- let 0s start a camP&ign that d.epicts the Ar ia its 
true light, Ready, willing and able to sink the Soviet, Also, 
let's clam up on this retaliation crap, Let's start taking the 
offense. 
lmphasize the program continuously but not to the degree 
that effectiveaess becomes lost, 
79 
We tend to hide o·ar good points under a basket. Let's sell 
the Air Force to the public. 
Yes. The program is not integrated USAF~wide. The program 
ie inadequately sponsored, both personnel and budget-wise. 
Put more emphasis on the mission and less on public relatioas. 
It seems to me that too muoh emphasis is placed on the Air 
Force as the Great White Hope instead of selling defense as a whole. 
I do not feel that the program is sufficiently carried out 
at the "grass roots" level. I still hear many ciYiliana refer to 
the "air corps• or "what 0s your job, sonay?• This indicates the 
pure word is not getting down to the people. 
Falls flat on its face in generating a favorable attitude 
on the part of the public or in generating guddance to USAJ 
personnel on how to generate a favorable response from the public. 
~ support on whT the military should be supported and be entitled 
to expect support as first-class citizens. Not mud dobber leeches 
on the soe;iety. 
In his book "Global Mission, • General Arnold said he thought 
the Air Corps had always made its job look to easy to the public. 
I believe that a greater respect for the Air Force and its mission 
could be gained if the Air Force showed more clearly some of ita 
problems as well as more clearly showing its achievements. 
"Public" should include the free world with the psychological 
implications directed at the USSR. 
~ impression has been that the USAF PR program ia strictly 
a stop~p measure. Continuous acceptable level of effort should 
be present, representing all Yital issues relatiYe to air power. 
I don't think it doee enough to inform A1 persoaael of 
e;urrent AF thinkiag in order to assure that all people are thinkiag 
along ~he same lines. 
I feel the Air Force has a commitment to support the goTera-
ment in educating the public to the current situatioa. This would 
tend to aid ia avoiding complacency in the American publico 
Let's get the truth about air power to the people. 
»very officer and man should be instructed in public and 
community relatione. Step selling the Air Force unofficially, 
do it through personnel, individually and officially. 
The need for public relations exists at the top level of the 
7 
···c:r, :'r1· ·;t;,;al observations have pointed out \he III&DT 
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deficiencies of the Air Force public relations program, This 
is particularly true in an industrial city such as Detroit, 
The Air Foree needs the support of key industrial and influea\ial 
citizeas, 
12, Miscellaneous: 12 
All Air Force peraonnel should be iadoctriaated in their 
personal responsibilities toward creating favorable public 
opinion, 
Not a job for the PIO alone, He should be the monitor. He 
should constantly have to keep a current roster of qualified 
speakers to seek opportunities for them to speak. Emphasis should 
be placed on high school academies. 
a, All officers should complete a ~ course in public 
relations, b. Should subscribe to or be provided with a moathly 
publication giving curreat AF thought (policy) and practical 
examples of successful public relations programs, speeches, etc, 
At present this information is available from maftT sources, One 
publication (extract) directed to the officers would be more 
effective, 
I know very little about it. 
More lecturel by Mr. Gill Robb Wilson Air Force-wide, 
We take for granted a basic public understanding of air 
power, which simply doesn't exist. The (the general Americaa 
public) public look on us as the panacaea for all the world's 
ills without knowing either our capabilities or limitatioaa, 
In ~ opinion -- aext to nothing about Air Power as a whole is 
secret, including the fact that we occasionally lose some 
aircraft and kill some crew• -- cannot get into actioa ia local 
war as fast as they thiak we can -- aad Jll11St use auclear weapoas 
for maximum effect oa small forces == etc, The list of secrets 
kept from the general American public is endless and to ~ miad 
~wrong! 
We need a much better program, 
No, in ~ buaiaeas I have aToided the public to the best 
of ~ ability. 
I see no way to formalize the program. If each officer 
will do his part to dispel the false ideas the public has -- this 
will be effectiTe enough, 
l do not think it is effective. 
It is .!.2l:U l 
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Seems like AF activities are curtailed in this areao There 
is cnly minimum change to the ci tizeas" thinking of Air Power. 
13. No comment~ 110 
AiT Command~ Staff College, Non~Bated Officers 
lo Favorable: None 
2o Favorable, but ~~ None 
3o Lack of emphasis on facts: None 
4. Lack of professionalism: 13 
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Have a better qualified care of key personnel who will educate 
them of decision (legislation) to the correct or valid stand to follow 
on military matters. 
Recommend that moTe qualified officers be placed in the PIO 
programo I have noted that many officers are assigned to this duty 
at lower levels of command {Base, Wing, etco), who are junior and 
lack practical experience. 
Recommend more officers and airmen be encouraged to join and 
participate in the functions of local and civic clubs in the commun-
ity in which they are stationedo 
USAF headquarters must place more emphasis on PR and initiate 
an effective program to include training and ass~ent of qualified 
personnel to the programo 
On~ that the PR job in some bases could be a full-time jobo 
Presently it"s handled by company grade officers as an additional 
dutyo 
Most public relations personnel are not qualified for the job 
they are assigned. At the lower levels of command most public 
relations officers are people who have had no experience or training 
in the fieldo 
Public relations officers for overseas units should be trained 
in political science. 
More emphasis should be given and more attention paid to public 
relationso Cutback of program 5 years ago hurt the Air Force. More 
officers should be schooled in public relations techniques, concepts, 
etoo GTeater recognition should be given to the program in order to 
attract more qualified people into it, Put the program back on a 
"public relations" basis and remove it from the information services 
category. 
The PR officer should be an outstanding JF officer with 6 or 
more years service and be specially trained in a PR school. He 
should be a good writer and a confident public speaker. 
Personnel assigned for this duty are not the type to enlist 
the cooperation of key personnel to assist them in their jobs. Too 
often they approach their job as being one in which they are selling 
themselves instead of the Air Force. 
Officers assigned to this duty should be aggressive and devo-
ted. 
At levels below that of major command, there appears to be a 
lack of a consistently oriented, effective program for the conduct 
of public relations. 
1. Assign an AJ!' indoctrinated man to the position and not 
recent ROTC graduates. 2. Provide guidance in such a w~ that 
the poor soul does not have to act apologetic when selling the 
Air Force pitch. 
Should be centrally controlled and specially trained. 
5. Lack of aggressiveness, dynamism: 5 
The program is spotty and appears in many cases to lack a 
valid objective. I think some areas (particularly overseas) the 
program tends to "talk down• to natives. 
Too much public relations effort is expended in promoting 
the Air Force to the Air Force =- in short, the AJ!' talks to itself 
too much through its PR effort. At present their programs tend to 
be of a negative reaction type rather than the positive conditioning 
progressive educational type needed. They should stop being "whip-
ping boys" placed in untenable positions but "fait accompli" and 
should educate in advance the public at large to the exigencies of 
a modern d~ JF. They should sell the unconvinced public rather 
than mothers and fathers who have alw~s been proud of their 
children's efforts and al~s will be. 
The AJ!' should take a new look at this program, establish 
objectives and take necessary action to develop an organization 
consistent with these objectives. 
Should have much more of it in a militant manner. 
Too much emphasis is placed on internal goodwill and not 
enough is placed on external good will. 
6. Lack of command support: 3 
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Publ1~ relations seems to have become a local "tool" of base 
commanders, Little thought goes into press release information. 
•u. S. Ar~ aircraft" is seen too often in print, •u. S. Air 
Force Rams Airliner" seems to be the only time the correct service 
n,cmenclature gets into printl 
The commander himself should be directed (and given authority) 
to conduct the program as he sees fit, His program should be judged 
(and he so rated) by the results it achieves. 
7. Other services better: 3 
The Navy has generally shown a better realization of public 
relations. We must tailor our operations in cases of crisis to 
good public relations. The recent backlog at Lackland was a prime 
example. Basic training in the desert, pup tents and straddle 
tracks coupled with a vigorous PR release on how Ar training was 
like to the Marines would have made many AF friends. 
Follow some methods used by the Ar~ and Navy in spreading 
Ar~ propaganda, ie, television, radio programs, etc, 
lie could learn much from the Navy public relations program. 
8. Lack of television: 6 
It appears that the Navy has been successful in at least 
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two informative traditions supporting TV programs which draw millions 
of viewers thus creating at least subconscious support of the Navy. 
The Air Force plays music -- Who likes to listen to music when there 
is an interesting story to be told1 
It is too restricted -- more should be done on a national basis 
such as now being done or sponsored by the U. S. Navy through such 
TV programs as "Silent Service• and •Navy Log." 
I think we miss the boat more often than not in our chance to 
educate the public that we are in a struggle for existence. What 
does the AF have that parallels the Navy's "Silent Service" or 
•Navy Log" or the Ar~'s "Big Picture• on TV? 
There is need for an Air Jorce commercially sponsored TV pro-
gram equal or superior to the "Silent Service.• 
Should advertise the Air Force --TV, radio, etc, 
Let's put weekly stories before the TV and radio audiences, 
I'm tired of watching the Navy and the A~ get all the play. 
9, Air Collisions: None 
as 
10, Overemphasis of trivialities: 3 
Too maDT PROs in small or~nizations tr,r to implement programs 
based on maximum lineage published in various publications, news-
papers, etc, This leads to guch items as "Sgt. Joe Zilch spent a 
three~day pass at the Garmisch Rest Center recently." This does little 
for the Air Horce, and PRO positions are better retained at higher 
levels where they may have a real function, 
Considerable vagueness concerning what AH PR policy is, A top 
eCJhelon organization which can define timely policy and can mobilize 
effeotive programs is considered essential. To be avoided are 
Bizarre sensational stunts which demean the prestige of the service. 
Similarly to be avoided are enlistment appeals which overstress the 
material, "give away" benefits to be acquired. This approach resembles 
the "box top" philosopbT. 
~ impression is that most press releases by base level PR 
personnel are trite and have little public interest. Also, in gen-
eral, PR claims for weapon capabilities are exaggerated, We still 
claim the B-17 was a 300 mph aircraft!! Let's give them the facta 
when we ca.no 
11. The Big Picture: S 
The average high school citizen doesn't know ~his USAH must 
train, fly practice missions and do other things that sometimes 
disturb his liesure, and result in his having to make minor sacri-
fices. 
Indoctrination and education to enable all persons to discuss 
freedom, liberty and one way of life. 
We vitally need a realistic program to inform the US public 
on the importance of all services and our national defense. 
Foremost in all PR matters should be the need for national, 
not service, matters. 
It should team up with public communications media (newspapers, 
radio, TV magazines, etc.) to develop a joint program of public edu-
cation, information ~~ national and international. 
12, Miscellaneous: 12 
First, a realistic program does not aeem to exist. Second, no 
public relations program can be effective which i~oses the extreme 
security restrictions that exist to~. ~ primary interest is in 
the restrictions iroposed on the true public relations expert, the 
average officer, who is in daily contact with the public, yet who 
cannot officially discuss issues of the ~ because of restrictions 
and laok of guidance, 
I would like to see a much tighter screening and a more 
lntense indoctrination of ~ WAr personnel sent to foreign 
countries. Right-balls are embarrassing. 
I feel that all Ar members have public relations responsi-
bilities. However, we do not know how to exercise actions in 
this respect, nor are our talents exploited by the Air Force. 
Staff offiGers in the Air Force are in particularly good positions 
to promote high public relations. 
It is an individual AF officer problem to sell the AF to the 
public. 
As far as I know, PRO activities of higher placed officers 
have been satisfactor,r. I think more emphasis should be placed 
on the role of the individual officer and airman. 
It stinks -- see Item 10 above (To inform the public of USAr 
policies, programs, etc. --not the glorification of the commander 
and his wife.) Of all the public relations programs I have ob-
served, I would say that 95~ of the effort was directed toward the 
glorification of the commander or his wife, senior officers or pet 
projects of these officers. ~or this reason I believe that the 
USAF public relations program is one of the poorest. 
It is sadly inadequate, 
I think it's been cheap, superficial and designed for idiotsJ 
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It is inadequate. 
Ve:ey poor. 
PR is everybody"s business. Bot a specialist. We do not 
need a specialist. 
1. Kliminate all amateurish or juvenile types of publicity 
in writing, TV, interviews and recruiting. 
2. Establish machinery to insure that all USAF officers 
receive personal copies of policy speeches by USAF and DOD leaders, 
3. Action instead of reaction, ie, the USAF is always placed 
in a bad light due to aircraft accidents, collisions, USAF personnel 
in auto aooidents, etc. The public should be oriented to understand 
these things can happen. And why. Understanding USAr problems 
should be known, through local editors, news analysts, civic groups, 
merchants, et~. 
4. Down play the obvious attempts to sell the Air Yorce, 
S. Insure that only mature and k;nowledgable officers hold PR 
responsibilities throughout the Air Porce. 
lJ. No comment: 53 
Field Grade Bated Officers 
L Favorable: 1 
I think it is improvingo 
2o Favorable, but ~- : 2 
You have an honorable job, make the most of ito But the whole 
Air Force shares the responsibility, make sure the other Air Force 
members understand thato 
The Air Force has made good strides in this field == but it 
is still inferioro Believe thia is d~ to top officials not wanting 
an aggressive program in sensitive areaso 
J o Lack of emphasis on facts: J 
Be absolutely certain that when stories are given to the news 
media, the untrained (technically) reporter understands the full 
impact of what is being saido Don't paint those tremendously rosy 
pictures of our achievements when there is no substance to the 
statements" 
lo It seems that when something unpleasant arises, USAF is 
always last to present its case to the vast public. 
2o We must cow tow to civilian writers who may or may not be 
interested 100~ in trutho We apparent!y have little recourse 
against the lad who plays footsie with the trutho 
Jo We are at a disadvantage because we have no media of our 
own that reaches all parts of the U, So Instead, we must defend on 
the newspapers, radio stations, owned by others, to spread the wordo 
We've got to be nice to these people so that they will give us a 
chance to air our caseo ~ point is =- we lack a solid guarantee 
of so many column inches, minutes, etco With no guarantee, we lack 
media when we most need themo 
We should prize intellectual honesty above all else in our 
public pronouncements and in dealing with out own military family 
everywhere, e.g"' if we tell a story, we should tell both sides as 
fairly as we know how == including the disadvantages of reenlisting 
as well as the advantages =- give our people credit for their 
rather keen senses of observation and judgment. 
4" Lack of professionalism: 2 
There are exceptions of course, but in most cases our public 
relations offi~ers are overweight, lacking in militar,r bearing, 
ignorant of how to wear the uniform, uninformed as to the real 
operational aspects of our service -- and" all too often, noticeably 
insincere in their public relations" I believe that remedial action 
should be a weeding out action =- that we should substitute for the 
car·eer "Chamber of Commerce• types, more impress! ve officers who 
can combine an operational background with excellent speaking 
qualities. I know of no function ~ important than public 
relations, especially~. If the Air Force is going to aid in 
the protection of America, it must have public support ~- and 
public support will never be sufficient if we do not gain under-
standing, respect and prestige, The current program is not helping. 
Public relations is not, as is so often practiced, the same 
as publicity and promotion. Exploiting the favorable and covering 
up the bad points cannot long sustain a good honest opinion, 
5. Lack of aggressiveness, dynamism, etc.: None. 
6. Lack of col!lllland support: None, 
7. Other services better: 2 
Indirectly, the UDited States Air Force has encountered 
unfavorable public relations due to its fre~ently changing and 
indefinite reserve program. Much of the Navy"s very effective 
public relations program is a by~produet of its well-organized 
reserve program. 
Yes ••• I believe the Navy approach is ~te effective ••• 
the Navy concentrates, at least this is ~ impression, on human 
interest stories about its personnel and makes releases with the 
local paper concerned (ie, promotions, new assignments, special 
accomplishments). 
8, Television: None. 
9. Air Collisions: None 
10, Overemphasis of trivialities: None 
11. The Big Picture: None 
12, Miscellaneous: 8 
They emphasize realtions with the public more than relations 
within the command. Members have to rely on service journals for 
their information, because the same information issued within the 
Air Force does not filter down or is purposely withheld (especially 
with regard to personnel matters). 
We probably spend too much money and resources on this activ-
ity as we do on so many peripheral areas of Al activity rather than 
directing such resources into firepower, training and supply and 
maintenanoe support. 
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PIO should better inform Air Force members of the functions 
and responsibilities of the PIO. 
Believe PR should be an area-type affair, not with offices 
at each base and command. 
The function is not well understood or appreciated by 
personnel of the same organization. 
It is apparently not getting to mBOT people. 
Generally ignores personnel in the service. 
They consistently release information without realizing 
the impact or base concern, They also refuse to release information 
about activation-deactivation when it is general knowledge in the 
Gommunities concerned. 
13. No comment: 17 
~ Grade Non~~ted Officers 
1. Favorable: 1 
It is improved very much in the last two years. 
2, Favorable, but -- : None 
3. Lack of emphasis on facts: 1 
USAF public relations, like all government informational 
activity is robbed of initiative because planned programs lend 
themselves to charges that they are tr7ing to •sell" something 
rather than provide facts on which future judgments can be 
based. This means all USAF and other efforts stem from a starting 
point of "disaster,• or "pressure• or "misunderstanding," and are 
attempts to right a wrong impression or explain. This circumstance 
at the root of what is wrong, is one which will never change in 
government press work. 
4, Lack of professionalism: 2 
There are insufficient PIO careerists in the USAF program, 
!SOs should be trained in an Air Force Info School and permitted 
to remain in the specialty throughout their military careers. It 
is better to have a specialist in one field than a jack-of-all-
trades-master~of-none in all fields, 
To clarify Item No, 1 (on the reverse), adequate was marked 
as the choice by the person filling out this ~estionnaire only 
because so many personnel assigned to the duties of public rela-
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tions in the field who are without proper background or training, 
and while they are accomplishing things in the job, do have the 
opportunity of learning proper methods to be exercised for good 
public relations, I believe that if it were possible, that every 
permanently assigned officer into public relations should be able: 
first to attend the Armed Forces Information School at Fort Slocum, 
N, Y,, then after practicing the profession for a period of, at 
least, one year, be able to attend the post~graduate course in 
Public Relations and CollllllWlications, offered by Boston University, 
In addition, every public relations officer should attend a good 
public speaking course, 
5, Lack of aggressiveness, dynamism: 1 
Too slow to take advantage of possible good. relations, Too 
slow to explain unfortunate incidents, Never seem to plan ahead to 
foresee future areas of conflict of interests. 
6, Lack of command support: 2 
Policywise, AF IS program lacks uniformity, regularity and 
standard direction, mainly because of the whims of commanders, 
each of whom personally determines the amount of PR he wants -- in 
some cases, none at all --and what kind. The condition is made 
worse because of irregular -~ from extremely talented to mediocre 
and poor-~ personnel shunted into PR; this, of course, reflecting 
on the commander. Additionally, it seems the Air Force tries to 
establish PR by directives, which can only provide guidance, and 
that usually negative in character, whereas PR is, if not an art, 
certainly an employment that requires creativity and imagination 
from its practitioners. In ether words, Ar PR is more than public 
relations; rather, it should be regarded and treated as a part of 
the basic education and indoctrination all Americans need to make 
them aware of the dangers they face and why air power is necessary 
to their survival, 7inally, air power cannot be any greater than 
the people who pay for it want it to be; therefore, they must have, 
as a basic requisite of American citizenship, a broader, deeper and 
more sympathetic understanding of air power, This should be 'he 
ai~ and aspiration of the USAF PR program; today it is not the 
case" 
Public relations, contrary to the muddled and fuzzy thinking 
of too mBn7 officers holding positions of command, is not the 
by-product of a shotgun wedding, It is a vital part of USAF 
operations, imPortant enough to tip the scales in favor of a first 
class rather than a mediocre formation. Accerdingly, infinitely 
more care should be taken in the selection of personnel assigned 
to PR duties; as much care as is taken in the selection of personnel 
for foreign service, 
7, Other services better: None, 
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8, Lack of television show: Noneo 
9o Air Collisions: None 
lOo Overemphasis of trivialities: J 
Newspapers are flooded with idiotic pictures and •news 
items" which editors ignoreo U has failed., in nv opinion, to 
sell itself on the basis of an honest stand on its doctrine, has 
0oncentrated rather on "public relations• or "community relations• 
which, while necessary, have swallowed up good PIO activityo 
I feel that in too many cases public relations functions 
are restricted to little mere than protocolo 
Public relations at USAP Acade~ appears to emphasize the 
superficial aspects of cadet life, such as uniforms, social events, 
and athleticso It ignores the academic aspects, and thus gives the 
public an erroneous impression ef life at the Acadenvo Examples: 
1) in TV ads addressed. to prospective cadets, uniforms, parades 
and dances are featured; the academic training all but ignered; 
2) in newspaper releases, minor details of cadet life are por-
trayed in an exaggerated manner, but academic activities are seldom 
mentionedo When a distinguished scholar speaks to the cadets and 
faculty, the publicity is nilo 
llo The Big Picture: None 
12o Miscellaneous: J 
The problem is always the same ooo too many Air Force 
efficers feel that public relations is the sole responsibility 
of the people assigned to public relations duties whereas if 
we are to gain our objectives, everyone in the Air Force must 
engage in some form of public relations effort actively and quite 
ofteno 
In nv opinion, the effectiveness of a given Command is 
directly related to the effectiveness of its PR program, parti-
cularly as concerns Community Relationso This is especially true 
in overseas Commands where the morale of the Base population 
so closely parallels community attitudes and facilitieso I do 
feel that we often fail \o take advantage of community potentials 
with resulting ill feeling, bad publicity for the Air Force, and 
low troop moraleo The PR staff should have direct access to the 
commander and advise him and represent him in all dealings with 
the civilian populaceo It should be his responsibility to be 
advised of the community "pulse" at all timeso 
Public opinion of USAF is a significant factor in a deme-
cratic governmental systemo 
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13. No comment: 10 
Companr Grade B&ted Officers 
1. iavorable: 1 
A few years back public relations was de-emphasized. At the 
time I thought this was a bad move -- still dol 
2. Favorable, but -~ : None. 
3, Lack of emphasis on facts: None. 
4. Lack of professionalism: S 
A PR man should be an outstanding officer not only experienced 
in PR work (newspaper contacts, etc.) but also a thorough knowledge 
of the nuit he represents. This knowledge should be gained by 
working at the lower levels in the unit. At this time, a PR man 
should be rated; however, in the age of missiles, this will not be 
necessary. 
(1) Too many info service personnel are inadequately 
informed themselves on the operations, programs and objectives 
of their unit or organization. 
(2) I do not feel that it is necessary to make a career 
field of info services. In ~ opinion, any line officer with a 
little guidance and an average amount of common sense could perform 
creditably. 
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Yes, I think too many PRs are BTO (Big Time Operators) --at 
least they think they they are. Most consider themselves overworked 
and underpaid, If they would just get down to the job at hand, they 
could acc~mplish a lot. Toe often we have journalism majors assigned 
in PIO instead of human beings with a knewle4ge of how to get along 
with people. However, the big job is to get some bard working 
people in the top jobs and give them the priority to assign top 
calibre people to PIO positions. Only then are we going to get out 
from under this "Hollywood sham" that our future and present PIOs 
(BTOs) have made for us, · 
It seems they often work in a vacuum -- and are the last to 
knew about or be brought in on current activities. 
Give PR men more formal education in the field. 
5. Lacks aggressiveness, 4ynamism: 3 
1. Decided lack of aggressive programming. 
2. Too much hand-to-mouth operation without adequate planning. 
3. Too little concern for lower echelon problem areas, 
Too little foresight and teo much hindsight. 
1. Public relations must actively and continuously be 
improvedo 
2. All facets must be investig-ated to establish where 
further work can be done. 
3. Material and methods must be streamlined (e.g., informa-
tional films, particularly AFIF (Air Ferce Information Film) series, 
should be pitched te a higher educational level. 
6. Lack of command support: 1 
Public relations seems to occupy a secondary position and 
appears to be considered unessential. No concentrated effort to 
gain favorable public opinion is in evidence, and contradicting 
and conspicuous lack of comment er unity is noticeable during 
periods of controversy. 
?. Other services better: Noneo 
8. Lack of a televisien show: None. 
9. Air collisions: 1 
Why the passive acceptance ef the blame imposed by ~irlines 
(United especially) fer all mid~air collisions? 
10" Overemphasis of trivialities: 1 
Many times goes everboard in trying to please local popula-
tion even after a well formed militar,r-civil relationship has been 
set up. 
11. The Big Picture: 1 
The USAF needs to exert far greater effert in explaining to 
the public the need for and the ability of the USAF. Geod public 
relations can be achieved only if the public has a firm understand-
ing and a genuine appreciation ef USAF operations and objectives. 
Efforts to improve public relations must be initiated at the high-
est level in the USAF, and these efforts should be closel7 cocrd-
inated throughout the USAF. 
12. Miscellaneous: 6 
I believe the public relations program has not been properly 
initiated to the average junior officer as to aims and purposes. 
Isn't public relations at present a function of Information 
Services Office? Let's get a better internal information program. 
9.3 
More propaganda to stress the importance of the Air Ferce in 
retaliation to individuals and erganizations that slander for reasens 
of personal gain. 
Let the USAF run its public relations program. Stop catering 
to ths civilian agencies, We have our work, we know what we have te 
do, let's sell our program and stick by it and stop shivering in our 
boots every time a civilian or civilian agency frowns at us. 
Too much reliance on civilian advertising agencies. 
Don't let the tail wag the dog. 
Company Grade Non-Bated Officers 
1. Favorable: None 
2, Favorable, but -- None 
3. Lack of emphasis on facts: Nene 
4. Lack of professionalism: 1 
I don't know of the existence of any planned program concern-
ing public relations. Most of the relations between the public and 
the Air Force seems to depend on the personnel within the Air Force, 
very few of which have had any training in dealing with people. 
S. Lacks aggressiveness, dynamism: 2 
Actually public relations seems te be a little lax at the time 
being and there is a definite lack ef publicity coming out to pers-
onnel. 
I don't feel anything is being gained through being apelege\ic 
about our work and trying to justify it. Further, disclosure of 
information that our own personnel are net free to divulge I believe 
hurts morale and slackens their security consciousness. An example 
of this was the recent Armed Forces shew at Westover. 
6. Lack of command support: 1 
If at base level, PR is synonymous with BISO, I would s~ the 
commander"s function was almost nil. It would be advantageous to 
th~ AF, in general, if commanders weuld take positive steps in 
developing AF's PR activities, Large civilian enterprises have led 
the way. 
7. Other services better: None" 
B. Lack of a television shGw: None. 
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9. Air collisions: None 
10. Overemphasis of trivialities: Nene 
ll. The Big Picture: None 
12. Miscellaneous: 6 
No, because I de not know enough about chain of command 
within public relations work, so I hate te be teo critical. But 
I feel there isn't enough counseling and guidance-- no effort te 
enforce delegation ef autherit7 once information leaves headquarters. 
I do not know a thing about USAF's mission and objectives. In all, 
I think a better job can be done. 
Though generally speaking it is adequate, I feel that citi-
zens of the local community often feel service people have it eas7 
with good pay and therefore take advantage or their securit7 by 
charging high rents, etc. The USAF does net reflect the amount ef 
cooperatien that exists between the different branches ef the 
service. I believe this ceoperatien exists. Recruiting statiens 
in some areas have given what appears to be false informatien, thus 
partly destroying trust in the Air ~erce and in service people. 
Public relations should be empnasized more between ~ units 
at base level. 
More time should be spent with civilian organizations and 
clubs and less time on the base. 
Bather than have you take this questionnaire as a sample, 
it would be best te disqualifT ~self as unqualified t~ make 
any comment. I have verT little eccasion te werk in or with the 
field 0n public relations. The Staff Chaplain. 
I have had ne eppertunities fer centact with the Air Force 
public relations program. 
lJ. No comments: J2 
Officer Candidates 
1. Favorable: l 
One of the most important functions of staff. 
2. Favorable, but 1 
In ten years I have seen them progress 
far from a pessible goal they might attain. 
is little aware of what the Air ~orca really 
greatly, but PR is 
The general public 
does. Closer relations 
should be maintained between them, The airmen should be instructed 
in PR in all tech schools and organizatiens, 
J, Lack of emphasis on facts: None 
4. Lack of professionalism: 1 
Too much personal gain, too little honest work on the part of 
the PRO, not enough well trained, dedicated PROs, USAF should act 
in a more aggressive role in PR • 
.5, Lacks aggressiveness, dynamism: 1 
They should sell the Air Force to the public, m&nT civilians 
have considerable misconceptions of today 0s Air Force, 
6, Lack of command support: None 
7. Other services better: 1 
I feel the Army has better public relations, Specifically, 
Fort Carson, Colo,, at Colorado Springs. They have a very active 
public relations program in comparison to the Air Force, 
8, Lack of a television show: 2 
None that would not have been made previously. I believe the 
USAF should establish a radio-TV program in this area. Said program 
should be broadcast in English and Spanish for the benfit of all our 
citizens in the area. Perhaps music-type programs are good, but I 
believe that a panel-type program answering questions about our Air 
Force would meet the needs and demands of the public, 
I believe the public relations for the Air Force should be 
predicated upon informing the public of projected inconveniences 
rather than after it occurs. A program such as the Navy had on 
the part the Navy plays in national defense on TV at a good time 
for viewing by the public, 
9. Air collisions: None 
10. Overemphasis of trivialities: 2 
Too much emphasis is placed on newspaper articles stating: 
"A/lC Joe Doakes is now stationed at Podunk AYB, etc." This is 
valuable time and money that could be used to propagate the role 
of the USAF in national security, The average citizen is complacent, 
He thinks the USAF is superior but is not being overtaken by the air 
arm of Russia. He must be jolted out of his lethargy, I believe 
the public's feeling toward the USAF would be on a high plane, if 
the need for the USAF were really felt by the individual citizen, 
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Do aw~ with flowery explanations on great achievements of 
the higher ranking officers of the USAF and let the people know 
the importance of the small member, Show the populace the big 
job that each member plays, from the lowest A/B {basic airman) 
to the highest general, Without a good enlisted staff an officer 
is lost, Let the people know this. An officer is only as good 
as his subordinates and vice versa. Give credit where it is due 
even if the gentleman receiving the credit is only an airman. 
11. The Big Picture: None 
12. Miscellaneous: 3 
No, other than an expansion of ~estion 9 (Where do you 
feel that public relations should appear on an organizational 
chart? Answer: Under Info Services, since they control the 
release of info to the public). This would put the PR in an 
advantageous position by putting the latest military news 
briefs and releases at his command. 
Have never see aPR officer or heard a lecture by one. 
I have long believed that some sort of school should be 
set up at ports of embarkation to completely (or as completely 
as practical) educate every member of the military as far as 
customs, etc., of a foreign country in which he~ be station-
ed. 
13, No comnent: 78 
oOo 
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